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Summary
Developments in digital technologies over the last 30 years have expanded massively human beings’ capacity to communicate across time and 
space (Section 13.1). Media infrastructures have simultaneously acquired huge complexity. By “media” we mean technologies for the production, 
dissemination, and reception of communication, but also the contents distributed through those technologies and the institutions associated with 
their production, dissemination, and reception. The relations between media, communications, and social progress are complex. More people 
can now make meaning and be connected through media, providing an important resource for new movements for justice and social progress. 
Meanwhile the uneven distribution of opportunities to access and use media is itself a dimension of social justice.
Media infrastructures, and media access, have spread unevenly (Section 13.2), and media’s consequences for social progress cannot be determined 
at a general level. Traditional and digital media have developed according to distinctive histories across the world (Section 13.2.1), with varying 
marketization and state control (case studies on China, Russia, Sweden, South Africa, Indonesia, and Mexico: Section 13.2.2). Inequalities of 
access to media infrastructures (Section 13.2.3) are stark, between and within regions and inside countries, with implications for the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). Cultural flows through media vary greatly within and between regions (Section 13.2.4).
Meanwhile (Section 13.2.5) people’s increasing dependence on an online infrastructure that mediates daily life increases the importance of the 
corporations, which provide that infrastructure. This has transformed the governance of media infrastructures (Section 13.3), with a shift from 
formal to informal governance and the growing importance of transnational governance institutions and practices, whereby corporations, not 
states, exercise predominant influence (Section 13.3.2), including through the operations of algorithms, with ambiguous implications for cor-
porate power and individual rights, for the public sphere and for social progress (Section 13.3.3).
Journalism has for centuries been a key institutional form for disseminating public knowledge, and so contributing to social progress (Section 13.4). 
While digital technologies have expanded who can do journalism (see Section 13.4.5 on citizens’ media), other aspects of digitization have 
undermined the economics of public journalism (Section 13.4.3), with new threats to journalists from growing political instability (Section 13.4.4). 
Even so, there are new voices within global journalism (see Section 13.4.6 on TeleSUR and Al- Jazeera).
The increasing networking of communications changes citizenship too, as citizens find information, develop imaginative loyalties and make 
practical connections beyond national borders, not only within the Global North (Section 13.5) and with particular implications for global youth 
(Section 13.5.2). A more “connected” life is, however, not simply “better” (see Section 13.5.3’s case study of life in a Chinese heritage village and 
Section 13.5.4 on the media- based oppression and resistance of precarious workers in East Asia).
Struggles for social justice through the democratization of media (Section 13.6) have acquired new prominence, echoing previous struggles (Section 13.6.1) 
and foregrounding the transparency and accountability of media infrastructures, and data flows in particular, (Section 13.6.2), with implications for the 
SDGs and Social Progress Index (SPI). Concerns include net neutrality, internet freedom, algorithms’ discriminatory operations, and the automated surveil-
lance on which most online businesses now rely. There are implications for state and corporate power (Section 13.6.5), which civil society has challenged 
(Section 13.6.4 on India and Facebook’s Free Basics). A bold new model of internet governance has emerged in Brazil (Section 13.6.6 on Marco Civil).
Yet media remain the channel through which many struggles for social progress are pursued (Section 13.7). An important example of innovative 
media use for social progress was the Zapatistas in Mexico (Section 13.7.1), but social movements’ uses of media technologies have taken many 
forms across the world, exposing important constraints (Section 13.7.2). Since old media generally do not disappear but are linked up in new ways 
through digital media, it is overall ecologies of media resource on which movements that struggle for social progress have drawn (Section 13.7.3), 
with struggles against the injustices faced by disabled people being an example of the creative use of media resources (Section 13.7.4).
Effective access to media is a necessary component of social justice (Section 13.8). But media’s consequences for social progress are complicated by 
uneven media access, the plurality of spaces where people connect through media, and the multiple uses of communication resources (hate speech 
is enabled by the Internet too). The SPI should measure the distribution of opportunities for effective media access and use, and address communi-
cation rights. Media infrastructures are a common good whose governance should be open to democratic participation. Concerns about automated 
surveillance and the environmental costs of digital waste must also be addressed. Our action plan and toolkit list various measures to these ends.
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13.1  Introduction: Media Infrastructures  
and Communication Flows
Media’s role in social change, and potentially social progress, is often 
assumed, rather than fully investigated. “Media” are inherently com-
plex, in themselves and in their consequences. By “media” we mean 
primarily technologies for the production, dissemination, and reception 
of communications, but (in accordance with the common usage of the 
word “media” and its equivalents in many languages) we include also 
contents distributed through those technologies and the institutions 
associated with their production, dissemination, and reception. By 
“social progress,” we refer to the development of societies towards the 
progressive enablement of human beings to fulfil their needs and cap-
abilities (Sen 1999; Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi 2009; compare the Social 
Progress Index [Porter and Stern 2015], especially “Access to informa-
tion and communication”). The consequences of media for social pro-
gress can be approached from many angles. Our main emphasis will 
be on media as providers of content and infrastructures of connection, 
since these are media’s most important aspects for social progress.
13.1.1  Media as Infrastructures of Connection
Developments in media technologies over the past three decades have 
expanded massively the capacity of human beings and automated 
systems to create, use, disseminate, and store information and con-
tent of all types across time and space. This has happened through 
the emergence of the Internet, the digitization of previously analogue 
content, and the development of new platforms and devices. Changes 
have come so fast that it is easy to forget the much longer history of 
media’s role in the formation of modern societies, polities, and econ-
omies. In this chapter we seek to recognize that longer history, while 
also reflecting upon the dramatic nature of media’s transformations 
over the past three decades.
Media inherently involve the production, sharing, and interpretation of 
meanings, and so media processes are always contestable and open 
to further interpretation. Yet media remain at the same time infra-
structure: networks of interdependencies that enable social, political, 
and economic action, but also encode both cultural and technological 
constraints. This double role of media, as both meaning and infra-
structure (Boczkowski and Siles 2014; Sewell 2005), requires investi-
gating both media cultures – what users and audiences do with the 
media, their “media- related practices” (Couldry 2012)  – and media 
affordances:  how media infrastructures shape the range of possible 
uses available to everyday users and audiences.
13.1.2  Media as Enablers of Increasing  
Cultural Complexity
Media infrastructures have acquired a particular complexity and reach 
in the past three decades due to the global but uneven spread of the 
Internet and social media platforms. Globalization has distributed flows 
of meaning more transnationally than before. Mundane exposure to 
media images and messages that flow from other parts of the world 
encourages people to become more reflexively open to the meanings 
produced in other places. This has generated unprecedented cross- 
border connection, dialogue, and solidarity.
However, the basic patterns underlying contemporary media flows have 
much earlier origins. From the birth of the press through the develop-
ment of postal, telephone, radio, and television networks, media flows 
and infrastructures have been crucial to successive modern forms of 
citizenship, providing information about governments and markets, 
connecting national populations and economies, providing forums 
for citizen practice and underpinning national identity (Anderson 
1983). Media flows and infrastructures have also played central roles 
in projects of political and economic domination, providing the infor-
mation necessary to govern empires, manage enterprises, and control 
populations. But media’s spread across the world has been uneven, as 
Section 13.2 explains.
Despite increasing convergence of platforms for media delivery, pro-
liferating media flows, and infrastructures have produced cultural 
complexity and increased the possibilities for cultural contestation, 
within and across national borders (Hannerz 1992; Iwabuchi 2002). 
Imagined communities, sustained by media, now proliferate involving, 
for example, marginalized people, diasporic communities, and polit-
ical activists. Digital media have also enabled more people to become 
active producers and disseminators of images and meanings. This 
expanded productivity of meaning through media has itself become a 
practical precondition for new movements for social progress.
13.1.3  The Social Justice Issues Raised by Media  
and Communications
Through media, individuals and groups have more cultural resources 
with which to interpret and challenge cultural forms. Such access 
enriches the modalities of political action and protest, with 
consequences for social change and social progress (relevant SPI 
indicators are “Personal rights” and “Personal freedom and choice”).4 
The political struggles against slavery in the nineteenth century and for 
the civil rights of all ethnic groups in the late twentieth century were 
also cultural struggles that drew on contemporary media resources. 
But because media impact is always contestable, the consequences 
of media practice and media innovations for social progress cannot 
be determined at a general level. Media globalization has both 
engendered indifference and disparity of attention and promoted 
dialogue and solidarity. Media and communications’ contribution to 
social progress must always be considered at more specific levels.
Nonetheless, since connection is important to people’s possibilities of 
action, the uneven distribution of opportunities to access media and 
use them effectively is a dimension of social justice in its own right. 
Improved “access to information and communications technology,” 
including “universal affordable access to the Internet” by 2020, is 
rightly a Sustainable Development Goal (SDG 9.c),5 but it raises fun-
damental social justice issues too. First, media are a key resource that 
enables the “reality” of particular social and political territories to be 
4 The SPI report is found in Porter and Stern (2015).
5 The SDGs are found in United Nations (2015).
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framed one way rather than another; as a result, media, through their 
operations, can perpetrate specific “injustices [in] framing” (Fraser 
2005:  79) the social world. Second, because media have the sym-
bolic power to construct general realities, media institutions comprise 
a resource whose long- term distribution can be unjust. Some battles 
for social progress contest particular media representations; others 
challenge media institutions’ general control over symbolic power. 
In still other cases, media provide a forum for challenging injustices 
unconnected with media.
The relations between media, communications, and social progress are 
therefore inherently complex. Measures of social progress (such as the 
SPI) require considerable adjustment if they are to fully take account 
of media’s contribution to social progress: measures of technological 
access alone are insufficient. Nor (see Section 13.2) is there a common 
pattern to how media institutions “work” in societies across the world. 
Even so, media and communications have important potential to con-
tribute to particular struggles for social justice.
13.1.4  Media, Communications, and the Longer Global 
Struggle for Media Reform
Now is not the first time that the implications of media flows and 
infrastructures for social progress have been considered on a global 
scale. Such questions were central to the MacBride Report prepared 
for UNESCO in 1980 (Many Voices, One World), which followed two 
decades of contested debate about “development.” The report proposed 
a New World Information and Communication Order (“NWICO”) and 
challenged the assumption that a global media infrastructure dominated 
by “the West” was good for democracy, social order and human rights. 
But the MacBride Report’s proposals were not implemented, and a 
recent attempt to revive their broad agenda (the World Summit on the 
Information Society in 2003)  has also achieved only limited success.6 
The history of “media reform” on a global scale is an interrupted one 
(MacBride and Roach 1989), which we discuss more fully in Section 13.6. 
Meanwhile, the relations between media and capitalist accumulation 
(Jin 2015; Schiller 1999) become ever more complex, and new market- 
based media infrastructures – for example, social media platforms and 
the vast infrastructures of data extraction on which they rely  – pose 
increasingly urgent questions for social life and democratic practice.
13.2  Media Industries from Print to the Internet
This section introduces the diversity and unevenness of media 
infrastructures, media access, and media’s cultural dynamics across 
the world. As such, it provides the reference point for later discussions 
of contemporary forms of communication inequality and opportun-
ities for, or threats to, public knowledge (Sections 13.3 and 13.4) and 
the emergence of new spaces for citizenship (Section 13.5) and the 
long history of struggles for “democratization of media” and “dem-
ocratization through media” (Zhao and Hackett 2005) (Sections 13.6 
and 13.7).
13.2.1  Traditional Media and the Internet as 
Infrastructures of Connection
Policy discourses about media have been dominated by the histories of 
how “modern” media (newspapers, radio, television, film) developed 
in Western Europe and North America. While scholarship on the com-
plex regional flows of media has challenged the dominance of Western 
history (Boyd- Barrett 1977; Iwabuchi 2007; Schiller 1969; Sinclair and 
Jacka 1996), the same geographical skewing has been repeated in 
recent accounts of the rise of the Internet (Chan 2013). We will argue 
against this simplified view.
No universal history of media is possible on a global scale. Today’s 
uneven global media landscape reflects many diverse histories: the 
contrasting reliance on public service versus commercial models 
of broadcasting in European and North American media systems; 
major linguistic and institutional diversity in Australasia and the 
Pacific; the contrasting roles played by state and market in India 
versus China; the super- fast growth of online connectivity in North- 
East Asian economies dominated by Chaebols (family- owned 
multinationals in South Korea); the contrasting legacies of coloni-
alism in media development in Africa and Latin America; the dis-
tinctive role played by Gulf petro- monarchies in the Arab region’s 
media. There are many possible relations between media, state, 
market, and society, each shaped differently by geopolitical forces, 
which rule out a universal narrative of “media and social progress.” 
In what follows we present case studies from different regions to 
underscore not only media’s diversity at a national level, but also 
how variously media and communication systems intersect to gen-
erate resources for social progress. Further case studies are added 
in later sections (Sections 13.4 and 13.6).
13.2.2  Case Studies
13.2.2.1 Country Case Study 1: China/ Russia7
Today, Russia and China have large media systems that are highly 
distinctive in that, while incorporating various market features, they 
trace their historical origins to twentieth- century state- controlled 
non-commercial media systems, whose organization had intellectual 
roots in Marxist- Leninist critiques of capitalist and imperialist control 
of the media in the West. As such, both systems share the legacy of 
today’s “social movement media,” but are also internally complex and 
marked by nationalistic and sectorial struggles. Indeed, the Chinese 
system had distinctive differences from the Soviet model and by the 
early 1960s, the Soviet and Chinese media systems were in serious 
ideological conflict. By the late 1960s, the Chinese media system was 
destabilized in the onset of the Cultural Revolution. Nevertheless, what 
these historical systems had in common was their communist visions 
of achieving social progress through ideological mobilization and cul-
tural enfranchisement. This vision provided many Third World post-
colonial states with alternative models for media organization from 
those in the West while also providing inspiration for social struggles 
in the West, including US civil rights struggles (Dudziak 2000; Frazier 
2015). However, bureaucratic ossification, and other forms of polit-
ical, social, and cultural repression, as well as the influence of Western 
6 For a reassessment, see WSIS Civil Society Plenary (2003).
7 Material on Russia in this case study written by Olessia Koltsova.
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media, contributed to the transformations of China’s and Russia’s 
media systems from the early 1980s.
The collapse of the Soviet Union left Russia with a television- centered 
noncommercial media system. Liberalization, fractionalization of the 
postcommunist political elite, and economic difficulties led to privat-
ization of state TV channels in the mid- 1990s. Newly founded private 
television channels emerged as the economic situation improved, 
bringing more diversity into the media landscape. However, the early 
years of the twenty- first century have seen a gradual renationaliza-
tion of most leading TV channels, outside the entertainment sector. 
The Russian government inherited from its Soviet predecessor direct 
control over transmission networks and appointment of the top 
television management. While the 1990s saw media wars between 
different television channels representing various political groups, 
the 2000s were marked by emergence of an identical pro- Kremlin 
picture on most TV channels. Social and media development is, 
however, very uneven across Russian provinces, varying from near 
subsistence farmers (with access to just 2– 3 analogue TV channels 
and no Internet) to highly networked and cosmopolitan major cities. 
The government’s television- based policy of media control is more 
effective in poorer, less connected regions. While the authorities have 
allowed a few oppositional media outlets (TV Dojd’ [Rain] on the 
Internet; RBC [RosBusinessConsulting] on cable and satellite; Ekho 
Moskvy [Echo of Moscow] on the radio), they have very little influ-
ence on public opinion. On a global scale, given the denial for two 
decades to Russian television of broadcasting frequencies in most 
post- Soviet countries, the government launched Russia Today as a 
news provider, which is rapidly emerging as a major transnational 
satellite channel.
Against the trend of most other Russian industries, the Russian internet 
industry has been very successful. Russia is the only country where 
local internet businesses have beaten global giants without any pro-
tective barriers, with Yandex search engine more popular in Russia than 
Google, while Vkontakte and Odnoklassniki social networking sites are 
attracting much larger local audiences than Facebook. Nevertheless, 
the Russian government is facing a challenging choice with regard to 
internet management. It has been eager to make the Internet a “loco-
motive” for the rest of the Russian economy, but this risks disrupting 
the vision promoted by the government’s continued control of 
Russian television, since government control of the Internet is weaker. 
Attempts to increase internet control through pro- government owner-
ship of Russian social media sites such as LiveJournal and VKontakte 
might drive a key segment of the news reading internet audience to 
foreign competitors such as Facebook. The Russian government has 
developed three main tactics: gaining ownership over online media; 
producing its own “user- generated content”; and blocking websites. 
The result has been a dramatic polarization of Russian audiences 
between a loyal majority and a critical minority both online and off-
line. This policy coupled with state support of internet- based creativity, 
has encouraged the Russian IT sector to move away from politically 
sensitive issues.
China’s post- 1980 media system has developed very differently from 
the Russian system. China’s media system retains its overall Leninist 
structure and core organizational principles, yet through post- Mao 
China’s economic growth and rapid industrial expansion, China’s print 
and broadcasting media industries are both larger and more highly 
developed, and more tightly integrated and centrally controlled than 
Russia’s. By mid- 2015, China had over 2,000 newspaper titles, nearly 
10,000 periodicals, more than 300 television stations with nearly 3,000 
channels, with an audience reach of 1.35 billion. However, following 
nearly four decades of state- directed commercialization, market con-
solidation, global integration, and digital convergence, China’s media 
also bear the hallmarks of market- driven systems familiar in other 
parts of the world.
At the core of China’s media and communications infrastructure 
are state- controlled media and communications conglomerations 
organized at national and provincial levels, including Xinhua News 
Agency, People’s Daily Group, CCTV, China National Radio and China 
Radio International, and state- owned telecommunication providers 
such as China Mobile, China Telecom, and China Unicom. Regional 
media conglomerates such as Shanghai Media and Entertainment 
Group, Guangdong Nanfang Media Group, and Hunan Satellite 
Television have also been highly influential in spearheading institu-
tional reform, operational innovations, and content diversification. 
While state control, political direction, and censorship remain an 
enduring issue for China’s media professional strata and citizens, par-
ticularly in relation to social media platforms, some outlets such as 
CCTV’s well- known prime time investigative show Focus Interviews 
have played a significant role in spearheading social reforms.
Since the late 1990s, the Chinese state has systematically aimed to 
build the size and strength of its media and communication operations. 
Targeted national initiatives such as the “connecting every village” 
project have significantly improved access in China’s remote areas, 
making China’s media and communication infrastructure one of the 
most advanced in the Global South. At the same time, as part of the 
Chinese state’s effort to address long- standing imbalances in global 
communication and promote its own vision of “globalization,” it has 
systematically expanded the reach of its media and communication 
industries, with CCTV establishing branches in North America and 
Africa, and China Telecom and China Mobile expanding globally. The 
Chinese state’s persistent effort to control the “commanding heights” 
of converging media and communication industries, regulate global 
media and communication flows, manage private and foreign cap-
ital investments, and pursue the latest technological innovations, 
has had a huge impact on the system’s evolving structure and values 
(Hong 2017).
China’s framework for developing its media and communications 
infrastructure does not therefore fit with the dominant Western lib-
eral framework that treats press freedom (and “internet freedom”), 
defined always as freedom from government control, as the precondi-
tion of social progress. Each framework is explained by its distinctive 
historical and geopolitical context: accordingly, the more the Chinese 
media system evolves, the more the Communist Party of China seeks 
to emphasize its Leninist founding principles.
Since the early 1990s, the Chinese state has mounted an all- out effort 
for information technology development through various “golden 
projects” to integrate network applications with Chinese politics, 
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economy, and society. In the aftermath of the 2008 global economic 
crisis, the Chinese state elevated the media, communication, internet, 
and cultural industries as a driver of economic restructuring (Hong 
2017). In early 2015, Premier Li Keqiang unveiled the Chinese state’s 
“Internet Plus Action Plan” to stimulate economic growth by inte-
grating mobile internet, cloud computing, big data, and the “Internet 
of Things” with modern manufacturing. No other issue has received 
as much strategic emphasis by consecutive Chinese leaderships in 
the past three decades. By the time China- based internet firm Alibaba 
made a record- setting stock market debut in New York in 2014, China 
had established itself as the world’s largest internet market in terms 
of the number of users, and in December 2015 China’s internet popu-
lation was 688  million  – just over half of the national population 
(China Internet Network Information Center 2016). Yet in this pro-
ject of making China into “a cyber power,” the Chinese state treats 
citizen access and government control as not opposed, but indissolubly 
linked (Xinhua 2014). Meanwhile, various sectors of Chinese society 
have enthusiastically embraced the Internet (as less tightly controlled 
than the traditional media), turning it into a new terrain of discursive 
struggles over China’s future.
These developments challenge any simplistic “state versus civil society” 
reading of how the Internet contributes to social progress: both the 
Chinese state and Chinese society have been empowered through the 
Internet (Zhang and Zheng 2012), with outcomes significantly different 
from the parallel history of media in Russia.
13.2.2.2 Country Case Study 2: Sweden
In contrast to government- controlled media regimes, Sweden’s media 
is shaped by a welfare state system and characterized by a dis-
tinctive relation between media and state, market and civil society. 
Traditionally, Sweden has had high voter turnout, and high levels of 
media and information literacy, not least due to the national subsidy 
system for print newspapers, which have resulted in a plurality of 
local newspapers with high readership. Typically, the subsidy system 
provided for a plurality of political positions, with at least two local or 
regional newspapers representing two political viewpoints. Like other 
European countries, Sweden has had a strong public service broad-
caster for radio and TV, which since the late 1980s has faced strong 
competition from commercial broadcasters. The communications infra-
structure has been well developed, with high penetrations of landline 
phones, mobile phones, and computers.
The development of Sweden’s news media has followed a similar 
pattern as other north European countries, with weakening public ser-
vice media (due to audiences migrating to commercial channels), and 
a drift within the press from a focus on opinion formation to a closer 
tracking of market demand (Weibull 2016). Newspapers are today 
facing dramatic declines in readership, and advertising has migrated 
to the Internet. News consumption has also migrated from traditional 
press to social media such as Facebook and Twitter. This shift has 
challenged Sweden’s distinctive relations between media and wider 
society.
Since the late 1990s Sweden has witnessed a tight horizontal inte-
gration of the media sector, with companies formerly working within 
one media developing tie- ins or purchasing companies in other 
markets:  Sweden’s largest media house Bonnier, a book publisher 
in the nineteenth century, moved early into publishing newspapers 
and weekly/ monthly magazines, and today owns television, cinemas, 
advertising, and social marketing outlets. The development of “media 
houses,” with particular regions’ media being largely controlled by 
local or regional media houses, has also undermined the press subsidy 
system, undermining political variety in spite of continued state sub-
sidy (Nygren and Zuiderveld 2011).
The digitization of media contents in particular has changed the power 
dynamics within the media industries, with the telecommunications 
industries acquiring increased importance because of their centrality 
to Wi- Fi and broadband networks. This infrastructural power was 
highlighted in 2016, when TeliaSonera closed an exclusive deal with 
Facebook for free surfing through their networks, perceived as unfair 
competition by Swedish news publishers in print and broadcasting and 
contrary to the EU regulation on net neutrality (compare Section 13.6.4 
on Facebook India).8
Because of its well- developed infrastructure for high- speed internet, 
Sweden is also known as a safe haven for internet piracy, with The 
Pirate Bay party  – its most prominent symbol (Andersson Schwarz 
2013; Larsson 2013) – acting as a focus for debates on media govern-
ance issues.
13.2.2.3 Country Case Study 3: South Africa
South African media are arguably the most technologically advanced 
on the African continent, offering a wide range of content across 
print, broadcast, and digital platforms. Its media landscape involves 
a three- tiered model of public, commercial, and community media. 
South Africa became a democracy in 1994, with its early period post- 
independence from Britain (1961) better seen as the continuation of 
colonialism in internal form (the apartheid system) (Visser 1997). But 
in many ways the country’s media show similarities with those else-
where on the continent, where colonialism, the postcolonial transition, 
and globalization have shaped media systems.
The changes that South African public broadcasting has undergone 
illustrate some of these shifts. As in other African countries under mili-
tary or one- party state rule, the South African Broadcasting Corporation 
(SABC) under apartheid acted as a state broadcaster. In 1991, the 
Windhoek Declaration, which was put together by independent African 
journalists and endorsed by UNESCO, initiated a move to greater 
freedom, pluralism, and independence as regards print media. This was 
followed 10 years later by the African Charter on Broadcasting, which 
created momentum for private, public, and community broadcasting. 
The Windhoek Declaration signaled a move towards greater independ-
ence of broadcasting continent- wide, even if in some countries like 
Zimbabwe there has been a deterioration in recent years (Kupe 2016). 
The Windhoek Declaration coincided with the period of negotiated 
8 SVT Opinion, May 2, 2016. www.svt.se/ opinion/ telias- uppgorelse- med- facebook- ett- slag- mot- svenska- medieforetag.
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transition in South Africa, which saw the SABC adopting a public ser-
vice mandate and media freedom entrenched in the new Constitution. 
The SABC has, however, never been fully publicly funded, and is largely 
dependent on commercial funding (Kupe 2014: 29). As in other African 
countries, the SABC has recently seen a “push- back” from government 
(Kupe 2016): some argue its editorial independence has eroded under 
pressure from an ANC government increasingly intolerant of media 
criticism. Other negative signs have been the proposal of a statu-
tory Media Appeals Tribunal that would impose harsher sanctions on 
offending journalists, and the Protection of State Information Bill that 
could criminalize whistleblowers, investigative journalists, and civil 
society activists who access information classified by government as 
secret (R2K 2015).
South Africa led the way in newspaper development in Anglophone 
Africa, with the publication of the Cape Town Gazette in 1800 (Karikari 
2007:13), and a centuries- old private commercial press. Under apart-
heid, mainstream newspapers either supported the regime (the 
Afrikaans- language press) or provided a limited critique (the English 
press), while an alternative, underground press engaged in a more 
radical critique of apartheid and faced harassment, censure, and 
closures. Democratization largely eliminated the parallelism between 
language and political orientation, and most South African newspapers 
adopted a watchdog approach to the government and reflected a lib-
eral, commercial consensus.
Meanwhile, South African media have been affected by global invest-
ment processes. The South African press was a major capitalist ven-
ture from its inception. For example, the South African media company 
Naspers has become a globalized conglomerate, while the Irish 
Independent group bought the largest English- language newspaper 
group in 1994, selling it in 2013 to the Sekunjalo consortium, in which 
Chinese business interests have a major stake. Widely seen as a vehicle 
for soft power in Africa, several state- owned Chinese media houses 
have offices on the continent (Kenya as well as South Africa), including 
the news agency Xinhua, the newspaper China Daily, China Central 
Television, and China Radio International. China has also funded 
Africa’s media and communications infrastructure (Wu 2012). The 
influence of the Chinese media presence and investments in African 
media on journalistic norms and practices has been controversial, and 
challenges any simple regional or Western- dominated model of media 
diversity.
During the transition to democracy, a particular attempt was made to 
strengthen the community media sector through the establishment of 
the Media Development and Diversity Agency (MDDA) to fund media 
owned and controlled by the community they serve, especially to enable 
more Black ownership of media (Banda 2006). Another important 
development has been the rise of popular tabloid newspapers, which, 
although commercially owned, provide perspectives from the poor, 
mostly Black, working class rarely found in mainstream print media 
(Wasserman 2010). Some of the most interesting alternatives to the 
mainstream print media in South Africa have been online (the Daily 
Maverick, The Con and Groundup). Such publications have provided 
critical analysis and investigative reporting often surpassing the 
mainstream press in South Africa in diversity and depth. Despite 
the obstacles in terms of access and reach, digital media platforms 
are increasingly reshaping social relationships and public spheres in 
Africa (Mabweazara 2015: 2). Meanwhile, the mobile phone has had 
a massive impact as a platform for Internet access, for reconstituting 
traditional modes of sociality (Mabweazara 2015: 2– 3), and, via social 
media platforms, providing spaces for citizens to engage in political 
debate and mobilize for social change.
13.2.2.4 Country Case Study 4: Indonesia9
An important case of a diverse media system is Indonesia, the lar-
gest economy in Southeast Asia with a population of 240  million, 
and the fourth largest democracy in the world. The establishment 
of Indonesia’s modern media system owes greatly to the legacies of 
President Soeharto’s five- year economic development plans, which 
centralized capital and inhabitants in Java. For decades the authori-
tarian state held strong control over media infrastructure and content, 
from the press, radio, film, satellite, to television. The media system was 
built to support state developmentalism, limiting civilians to accessing 
information provided by the state.
During the 1960s– 1980s, Indonesia had a single, state broadcasting 
system, Television of the Republic of Indonesia. Although designed as a 
network system, television infrastructure and production relied heavily 
on central funding and programming (Sen and Hill 2000). The state- 
controlled television system shifted to an open, privatized, and more 
liberal system in the late 1980s as a consequence of the government’s 
open market and open sky policy. These policies allowed foreign con-
tent via satellite television and cable networks (Hollander, d’Haenens, 
and Bardoel 2009), which catered to the needs of the expanding urban 
middle class. By the early 1990s, dozens of private television stations 
had been founded, owned by the President’s close allies. This gave 
precedence to market demand over commercial news, and gradually 
weakened state control over information. Around the same time, the 
Internet came to Indonesia, providing an alternative source of infor-
mation to a small elite in Java (Lim 2003; Sen and Hill 2000). Media 
liberalization and commercialization of information paved way for the 
growth of a civil society (Hill and Sen 2005; Hollander et  al. 2009), 
which was the prelude to Indonesia’s transition towards democracy.
The authoritarian regime finally broke under the weight of the Asian 
economic crisis of 1997, in the face of increasing public pressure and 
conflicting interests within the ruling elite, starting a social transform-
ation among an expanding middle class amid conditions of unpre-
cedented economic growth (Basri 2012). While market demand over 
commercial news had helped the push for democratic transition, since 
the early 2000s the development of the news media in Indonesia have 
relied more on market responses rather than having an independent 
democratic agenda (see Lim 2011). Television is Indonesia’s most 
popular media with a penetration rate of 97 percent (Nielsen 2014), 
and it continues to attract the dominant share of advertising income.
Second to television, the Internet has the highest penetration rate of 
34.9 percent in 2014 (APJII 2015) or 88 million users to 51.8 percent in 
2016 (APJII 2016). Nielsen (2014) estimated that 48 percent of mobile 
9 Case study written by Inaya Rakhmani.
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phone owners use their phones to access the Internet. This has caused 
the closing of print versions of newspapers, while digital news has seen 
a steady rise. Over two decades, Indonesia’s media have seen a con-
vergence whereby established media companies, initially specialized 
in one form of media – print, television, or online – are expanding into 
other media, forming larger, multiplatform converged conglomerates 
(Tapsell 2015). Indonesia experienced the largest number of mergers 
and acquisitions in the history of its media system in 2011 (Nugroho, 
Putri, and Laksmi 2012), establishing four large media conglomerates, 
namely MNC Group, Jawa Pos Group, Kompas Gramedia Group, and 
Mahaka Group (Lim 2012). There has emerged a set of interconnected 
relationships between politicians and media proprietors, with various 
political leaders owning media companies. The CEO of MNC Group, 
Hary Tanoesoedibjo, founded and heads the political party Perindo, and 
ran for vice president of Indonesia in 2015. MNC Group owns three 
terrestrial television stations, one pay television station with 60 per-
cent of market share, 14 local television stations, one newspaper, one 
online news portal, and several franchise magazines. This has allowed 
media conglomerates to republish the same news content on multiple 
platforms.
Significantly, the Internet infrastructure and service provision remain 
dominated by state enterprises Telkom and Indosat, which cater mostly 
to urban users in large cities. Media markets and conglomeration are 
concentrated in Jakarta and Java more broadly, monetizing the activ-
ities of internet users in large cities while excluding users in rural areas 
and small cities. Only 20 percent of women in Indonesia have internet 
access (World Wide Web Foundation 2016), which calls for new ways 
for inclusive approaches that are gender- informed (see Triastuti 2014). 
International forces are important too: in 2015, 70 percent of digital 
advertising revenue in Indonesia (USD 560  million) went directly to 
Google and Facebook, rather than national companies. Consequently, 
media systems in Indonesia today still reflect the centralization model 
that was established since the 1960s, while also registering the power 
of global digital platforms.
13.2.2.5 Country Case Study 5: Mexico10
The media system in Mexico is highly concentrated and deeply 
marketized. Its core is commercial broadcasting, owned by private 
corporations controlled by a handful of individuals. The power of those 
media corporations was built from alliances between powerful eco-
nomic groups aligned with government interests that have benefited 
from discretionary grants, television and radio concessions, lucrative 
contracts for governmental advertising in print media, and ad hoc 
legislation (or lack of it) in favor of the sector’s economic interests.
After the Mexican Revolution (1910– 1920) the country adopted a cap-
italist economic model and initiated a corporatization of the Mexican 
State. From 1929 to 2000 all presidents were members of the Partido 
Revolucionario Institucional (PRI). Lack of regulation and communica-
tion policies led to a concentration of media in a few families. In the 
early twentieth century, well- established industrial families (railways, 
mining, and banking) invested in radio broadcasting. After the First 
World War, US capital replaced European investments in Mexico, with 
large investments in the radio industry (radio stations, manufacture 
and sales of radio devices, records, phonographs). Today there are 
1,600 radio stations, but 80 percent of them are owned by 13 com-
mercial families.
In 1950 the Mexican television industry started, modeled on the US 
commercial system. The families who owned radio stations became, 
in turn, the owners of television stations, for example, the Azcárraga 
family, which, from its original concession of Channel 2, grew through 
mergers to create the now better known Televisa (Televisión Vía 
Satélite). From 1972 to 1993 Televisa was Mexico’s only private televi-
sion company, competing with three public television channels. From its 
origins, Televisa had a close link with the ruling party PRI. Televisa sub-
sequently became the most influential global producer and distributer 
of Spanish- language audiovisual contents, and currently owns free- 
to- air television channels, restricted television systems (satellite and 
cable), a leading Spanish editorial house, radio stations, entertainment 
companies, soccer teams and stadiums, music recording companies, 
and cinema distribution companies. In the early 1990s the public tele-
vision channels 7 and 13 were privatized. The Salinas Pliego family 
(owners of departmental stores and previously radio manufacturers) 
bought both channels and created Televisión Azteca offering contents 
similar to those of Televisa and aligning itself with the government.
The early 1990s also saw the privatization of telecommunications, gen-
erating another monopoly (Telmex- Telcel) in the hands of just one indi-
vidual, Carlos Slim. Slim’s monopoly started with landline telephone 
services (Telmex has 65 percent of the national market) and moved on 
to mobile telephony (Telcel has 65 percent of subscribers) and internet 
services (75 percent of subscribers). The government justified the sale 
of the nation’s telephone company to a single owner by arguing that 
a monopoly would scale economies, lower costs, and increase the 
number of landlines. However, Mexico’s mobile phone and internet 
service costs are actually in the middle of international rankings 
(International Telecommunications Union 2014), and, although, since 
the early 2000s, internet home users have grown from 5 percent to 
61 percent of the population, the digital divide between urban and 
rural areas has widened.
Political reforms have continuously supported deregulation and pri-
vatization, and changes in legislation have meant more power and 
influence for media monopolies, generating a mediacracy, where 
members of senate and congress have direct links with the media 
industry. In 2012 the PRI party regained the presidency of Mexico, 
with Enrique Peña Nieto elected with the full support of the media 
industry, mainly Televisa. In 2013 Peña Nieto promoted a historic 
constitutional reform in telecommunications and broadcasting with 
the aim to increase competition in the sector. The new legislation 
enabled Televisa to enter the telecommunications market by offering 
triple play services (cable television, landline telephone services, and 
the Internet). Televisa now controls the market of restricted televi-
sion (cable and satellite) with 60 percent of subscribers and in 2014 
and 2015 purchased two new cable companies. The new legislation 
punishes Telmex by imposing strict restrictions on telephone carriers 
(cancellation of long distance fees; a prohibition on charging for inter-
connection services).10 Case study written by Claudia Magallanes- Blanco.
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There are also positive aspects to this new legislation. While public ser-
vices are still offered by private entities through concessions regimes 
that distinguish between commercial, public, and social media (indi-
genous and cultural), with the latter not allowed to sell advertisements 
(previously community and indigenous media were not recognized, and 
so operated outside any legal framework), telecommunications and 
broadcasting have now been defined as fundamental human rights and 
public services (compare SDG 9.c). As for telecommunications, the new 
legislation reserves a portion of the spectrum for social concessions, 
reflecting the work done by the community cellular network in cre-
ating a network of mobile phone services for indigenous communities 
previously denied mobile phone services by the major telecommunica-
tion companies. Civil society activism in Mexico has begun slowly to 
correct for some of the excesses of previous marketization.
* * * * *
The section has introduced the diversity of the world’s media systems 
and their organization: state, market, and civil society may work in iso-
lation or together in multiple combinations, with varying consequences 
for how media and communications outputs provide a context for 
social progress and struggles for social justice.
13.2.3  Unevenness of Access
The stark differences in access to media between population sectors 
may have consequences for social progress. It is significant that basic 
levels of mobile phone subscriptions and internet access are included 
as items in the SPI, alongside concerns about state control of media 
registered in the press freedom index (compare SDG 9.c).
Effective media access depends on the interrelationship between 
media and other closely related factors:  literacy, language, and edu-
cation (SDG 4). This is the central lesson from the “digital divide” 
debate: that simple availability of technology is not sufficient for devel-
opment or social progress. Empowerment of people through Media 
and Information Literacy is an important prerequisite for fostering 
equitable access to information and knowledge and promoting free, 
independent, and pluralistic media and information systems (UNESCO 
2013). Adequate levels of media use require training and education, 
democratic participation, accessibility of formats and technology for 
people with disabilities and other distinctive needs, diverse content in 
appropriate languages, freedom of expression, and opportunities for 
community and citizen- produced media. The 2005 Tunis Agenda for 
The Information Society acknowledged these factors, and they have 
since been the focus of international efforts (WSIS 2005). The multi-
faceted nature of “access” is crucial to understanding media’s inte-
gral role in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals, and broader 
social progress (International Telecommunications Union 2016) (SPI 
“Access to information and communications”).
Globally, there has been progress on access to internet and mobile 
phones in the past 20  years (SPI “Access to information and 
communications”; “Mobile telephone subscriptions”). However, 
what such broad indicators of “access” mean on the ground is poorly 
understood:  much depends on what kinds of media, internet, and 
mobile content people can affordably access. What media access do 
people need as the minimum for a “universal” service? Without closer 
attention to these questions, today’s push to ever- greater digital con-
nectivity only risks deepening digital exclusion.
There are regions with highly uneven media access. Asia, for instance, 
includes countries such as South Korea and Japan, both pioneers in 
digital media, as well as emerging powerhouses (India, China). India 
has gone from fewer than 1 percent of individuals using the Internet (in 
2000– 2001) to 18 percent in 2014; China has moved from 1.78 percent 
in 2000 to 49.3 percent in 2014. Yet other Asian countries have poor 
media infrastructure, including Bangladesh (9.6 percent internet users) 
and Laos (14.26  percent) (International Telecommunications Union 
2015). In Latin America, the mobile phone landscape is not homo-
genous, but the rapid spread of mobile phones is in part explained by 
the previous lack of landlines. In a number of countries, total figures for 
mobile phone subscriptions are high – for instance, Chile, Argentina, 
and México (International Telecommunications Union 2016). However, 
on closer inspection, there is a significant proportion of the population 
in these and other countries without adequate access to mobile com-
munication – either through not owning a phone or through restricted 
use of services due to affordability (Donner 2015).
Within countries, there are also striking disparities in access (SDG 9.c), 
especially in rural and remote areas, among different sociodemographics, 
cultural, ethnic, and racial groups, and groups with reduced or uncer-
tain legal or citizenship status (for example migrants and internally 
displaced persons). Upon closer inspection, many cities with apparent 
“good infrastructure” display great differences between the media 
“have- less” and “have- mores.” Yet other countries have seen extra-
ordinary large- scale growth. Among China’s 688 million internet users 
(2015), the vast majority (620 million) use social media applications 
such as Weibo and Tencent’s Wechat; around 90  percent of China’s 
internet- using population access the Internet through mobile phones, 
while internet use for online payments, access to online education and 
medical services, has become widespread among the middle classes.
We must, however, note the continuing lack of gender equity in access 
to and use of media. Significantly fewer women are connected to the 
Internet than men. In 24 of 29 European countries between 2008 and 
2010, men outnumbered women users of the Internet. For the same 
time period in non- European countries, men outnumbered women 
users in 36 of 39 countries (comprising OECD and non- OECD coun-
tries). The “global internet user gender gap” widened from 11  per-
cent in 2013 to 12 percent in 2016. In the poorest countries, the gap 
is large:  31  percent in the least developed countries. On a regional 
level, there is significant disparity in the gender gap:  23  percent in 
Africa compared to the Americas. In many countries, gender often 
intersects with other factors (e.g. location, age) to create even deeper 
inequalities. Only a few countries report higher internet use by women 
compared to men (International Telecommunications Union 2016).
Such figures give just a partial insight into a complex situation of 
inequality. Profound changes in media technologies are typically 
accompanied by promises to improve gender inequalities yet such 
technologies are often unaffordable for many groups of women, and 
gender is often neglected in design, education, and resource processes 
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crucial to ensuring communication rights. The emergence of new 
technologies may generate new kinds of injustice and exclusion: mis-
ogyny and oppressive gender relations have taken disturbing forms 
on social media platforms. Such gendered aspects of media and ICTs 
significantly hinder social progress, as noted in the agenda laid out by 
UNESCO‘s Global Alliance on Gender and Media.
Media’s contribution to social progress cannot therefore be under-
stood without grasping both the distribution and differentiation of 
media access, and how they shape possibilities for political and social 
agency.
13.2.4  Cultural Flows of Media Within Regions
Putting the complexities of media infrastructure to one side, media’s 
cultural forms and consequences also vary significantly from region to 
region. Western colonial powers such as the United Kingdom, France, 
and the United States dominated global information flows during and 
after the colonial period. Those media culture flows were unevenly 
shaped by the long- standing centrality of the United States, with 
which even the United Kingdom and France could not compete. Some 
Western countries (such as France) developed media regulation to con-
test US cultural dominance and foster “national culture.”
In a globalized world, however, more complex flows of media culture 
have evolved. Cultural globalization does not simply homogenize the 
world, but instead reorganizes the production of cultural diversity 
(Hannerz 1996). By creatively localizing and indigenizing US cultural 
influences, some non- Western countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, 
Japan, South Korea, and India have achieved high levels of media pro-
duction capacity, especially in the last two decades. The media outputs 
of those countries circulate transnationally and are favorably received 
within and beyond their regions, generating important counterflows 
to US dominance.
In Latin America, the predominant mainstream cultural flow is 
telenovelas, or “soap opera” TV drama series, which have been exported 
globally. Export formats have evolved from selling program series to 
selling only the show’s central idea or main character (Biltereyst and 
Meers 2000; La Pastina and Straubhaar 2005).11 Mexican, Brazilian, and 
Colombian television content has shifted what Latin Americans watch 
on their screens. If 1970s and 1980s generations grew up watching 
mainly US- produced imports, today’s Latin American audiences are 
exposed to the customs, lifestyles, and social fabric of Latin American 
communities themselves. And, although Latin American media content 
still privileges the visibility of upper class and predominantly White 
groups, some content does depict the experiences of working- class 
and non- White Latin Americans. Additionally, free trade agreements 
and the growing number of migrants from Latin American countries to 
North America have generated new North– South media content flows; 
since 1994, Spanish- language media has grown exponentially in the 
United States, and Univisión (owned by Hallmark) and Telemundo 
(owned by Sony) are the two main Spanish- language cable television 
networks. Univisión benefits from an agreement with Mexico’s Televisa, 
including a pipeline of Spanish- language content. Other lesser players 
in the global field of Spanish- language media include CNN, BBC, MTV, 
and Fox, with news and sports channels entirely in Spanish.12 But 
overall the unevenness of mainstream audiences’ daily media fare has 
not changed much since the mid- 1990s: Latin American media include 
mostly Latin American and US content (music, films, TV), plus a trickle 
of Japanese anime and European media content (mainly BBC). Flows 
from other regions of the world (Africa, South and Southeast Asia) are 
still scarce.
The impact of globalization on African media has also shifted the flows 
and contraflows of media content and capital. After the long dominance 
of ex- colonial powers, many countries have recently developed media 
production capacities. A prominent example is the growth of the Nigerian 
film industry “Nollywood,” which exports to a global audience (Krings 
and Onookome 2013; Larkin 2008). It has become the third largest 
global producer of feature films, next to Hollywood (United States) and 
Bollywood (India), relying increasingly on coproduction and distribution 
with the Ghanaian film industry. Also notable are the growing African 
and global footprint of the South African media giant Naspers, and sig-
nificant foreign investment in African media firms, especially from China 
(Xinhua news agency, China Central Television: see Section 13.2.1).
In Asia, India, Hong Kong, and Japan have developed local film and 
TV industries and their outputs have circulated within the region 
for many years. However, circulation outside the region has jumped 
sharply in the last two decades. The global diffusion of Bollywood 
films has become much more prominent (Kavoori and Punathambekar 
2008; Gopal and Moorti 2008). In East Asia, cultural products such as 
manga, animation, video games, and TV dramas produced in Japan 
have generated a regional and global media culture since the 1990s 
(Iwabuchi 2002). Even more notable is the so- called “Korean Wave” 
(or Halryu, a term first coined by Chinese reporters in 1999), whereby 
Korean cultural products such as films, television dramas, fashion, and 
popular music (K- pop) have penetrated other Asian markets (Chua 
and Iwabuchi 2008; Kim 2013), Europe, and Latin America. The Korean 
Wave offers an intriguing example of how national cultural policy can 
be used as a form of soft power, bolstering local production capacity 
and promoting the export of media culture by “creative industries.” 
South Korea’s interventionist cultural policies position the Korean cul-
tural industry as a “sub- empire” of the Hollywood system in Asia. The 
“Korean Wave” thus signifies the Korean culture industry’s ambiguous 
position as both a counterflow against the Hollywood system and a 
subflow co- opted by Hollywood.
This complexity characterizes counterflows in other regions too. The 
more counterflows to American media culture advance, the more 
market- driven governance encompasses them. Even though relatively 
independent from the cultural dominance of the “Hollywood empire,” 
the rise of media culture flows in non- Western regions has given rise 
to new intraregional asymmetries. American media culture maintains 
11 The best example is the Colombian Ugly Betty, which has a Mexican and a US adaptation, each completely different from the Colombian source, apart from the main character 
(Miller 2010).
12 http:// palabraclave.unisabana.edu.co/ index.php/ palabraclave/ article/ viewFile/ 4669/ pdf.
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a pivotal presence, yet in a way that goes beyond a straightforward 
understanding of American cultural hegemony. Hollywood itself has 
striven to incorporate capital, talent, and narratives from many parts of 
the world and develop outsourcing of postproduction labor on a global 
scale (Miller et al. 2004). The rise of non- Western media cultures forms 
part of a market- driven recentralization in which diverse players across 
the world collaborate to penetrate transnational markets, engendering 
a new kind of governance via marketing, coproduction, distribution, 
and copyright monopoly. Section 13.3 will discuss the emergence of 
global governance infrastructures for the regulation of information 
and data.
This is not to underestimate the newly emerging landscape of media 
globalization. Together with the progress of digital communication tech-
nologies, the acceleration of human mobilities from and among non- 
Western regions (by migrants, expatriates, students) has complicated 
the cross- border circulation and consumption of media cultures. 
Meanwhile cultural counterflows between diverse regions and coun-
tries cultivate cross- border exchange and dialogue, with important 
implications for social progress. Regional circulation of diverse media 
cultures has enabled new kinds of cross- border connection, mutual 
understanding, and self- reflexivity by people about their own society 
and culture. The mutual consumption of media cultures, for example 
of entertainment genres popular with women audiences such as soap 
operas, has enabled mutual understanding of societies and cultures, 
for example in regions such as East Asia. However, as it is predomin-
antly market- oriented forces that have advanced cross- border media 
circulation, it is the commercially and ideologically dominant elements 
of each country’s media culture that tend to travel, under- representing 
marginalized voices (Iwabuchi 2002, 2015). Crucial questions thus 
remain:  whose voices and concerns are excluded, what perceptions 
of self– other relationships are typically promoted, and which issues 
are under- represented, as the marketization of media culture flows 
advances? Section 13.5 considers the ambivalent consequences for 
practices of global citizenship that such media connections may foster.
13.2.5  Digital Disruptions and Transformations 
(Technological, Geo- Political)
Even before 2005, the global media landscape was highly uneven, and 
its implications for social progress correspondingly complex. Some key 
developments since the middle of the century’s first decade (when 
Facebook, the world’s current most successful social media platform, 
was launched) have increased this complexity considerably. Of course 
there is not today “one” Internet – much of the Internet is inaccessible 
in language to large sections of the world’s population – but some key 
patterns are clear.
The key technological development has been the shift from so- 
called “web 1.0”  – a system of media infrastructure based on dis-
crete websites, connected by hypertext links, with access obtained 
from desktop or laptop computers – to “web 2.0” characterized by 
increasing use of interactive online platforms, in particular social 
media platforms. Today, both platforms and websites are increasingly 
accessed from phones and other mobile devices, and the applications 
(or “apps”) embedded within them. This change from a “read only” to 
a “read/ write” interface has intensified internet use and its embedding 
in daily life, heightening institutional attention to how audiences can 
be reached online and stimulating the rise of a vast commercial infra-
structure of online data collection and data processing. This shift in 
media as “infrastructure” has involved also a significant cultural shift, 
as patterns of use have changed (a shift in media as “meaning”). This 
double shift has multiple consequences.
First, the increasing dependence in daily life on a complex, distributed 
online infrastructure for mediating daily life changes the power 
dynamics within the media industries, leading to the increased import-
ance of the telecommunications industries that provide infrastructures 
of connection (Wi- Fi and broadband networks). Market convergence 
means that telecommunications providers have the power of control 
“in the last instance” over the communication systems on which all 
content distribution depends (Bolin 2011). Consider the vast scale 
of some new media infrastructure companies:  Google‘s annual rev-
enue in 2015 was 74.5 billion USD, Facebook‘s 17.9 billion USD, and 
Amazon’s 107 billion USD.13
But the global balance is no longer one of simple US dominance. By 
the end of 2014, of the top 10 internet companies in the world, 6 are 
US and 4 are Chinese. Indeed, the growing power of China’s internet 
market, with its distinctive Chinese platforms (Sina’s Weibo, Tencent’s 
Wechat) is such that Shi (2015) has argued that cyberspace now has 
two camps, GAFA (Google, Amazon, Facebook, and Apple) and BATJ 
(Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, Jingdong). As a result, “the material founda-
tion for US– China co- governance of the Internet is in shape” (Shi 2015). 
This observation was made at the 2015 World Internet Conference 
Wuzhen Summit at which the Chinese state’s effort promoted its goal 
of shaping the future of global internet governance, a strategy with 
profound implications not only for China, but also for global commu-
nication politics.
Second, such developing power concentrations have implications for 
evermore sectors of everyday life from government to health (SDG 3). 
Take also education (SDG 4): concerns are developing regarding school 
learning materials increasingly provided not by the state but by com-
mercial media companies such as Apple and Google through initiatives 
such as Apple Education and Google for Education. Weaker welfare 
and public service systems are creating opportunities for market 
advances in areas such as education that were not previously much 
commercially exploited (Forsman 2014; Selwyn 2014).
Third, none of these developments would be possible without a huge 
double development in media’s “infrastructures of connection”:  the 
vast infrastructure of data collection and processing that drives the 
activities of search engines and all sorts of digital platforms and, under-
pinning them, the default infrastructure of “cloud computing” (Mosco 
2014) that provides the capacity necessary for such data collection and 
processing, and for the general expansion of computer- based informa-
tion processing in everyday life (for example, the “Internet of Things”). 
Both developments expand what we mean by “media” and create 
new challenges for governance (see Section 13.3).
13 www.statista.com/ .
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At the same time, deep inequalities of access remain, as noted 
in Section  13.2.2. The African continent, for example, remains 
characterized by widespread poverty, huge socioeconomic inequal-
ities, and highly differentiated patterns of media access and use, 
with the central parts of the continent most deprived (Porter and 
Stern 2015:  17, 50). Such inequalities have important implications 
for citizens’ ability to participate in any mediated public sphere (see 
Sections 13.4 and 13.5).
We cannot therefore say that the “whole world” is being transformed 
by media at the same time and in the same way. Yet the overall dir-
ection of these large- scale transformations is changing how we think 
about media’s potential contribution to social progress.
13.3  The Governance of Media Infrastructures
As we showed in Section 13.2, the global media landscape is com-
plex and uneven, reflecting many diverse histories. The often opaque 
structures of media governance that have emerged in the digital era 
are another factor that complicates media and communications’ con-
tribution to social progress.
13.3.1  The Evolving Relations Between Media 
Infrastructures and Government Regulation  
of Information Flows
Governments worldwide have expressed interests in regulating media 
infrastructures. In some cases, such interests take the form of laws 
directly prescribing the conditions of information access and exchange 
or the technical capabilities of media infrastructures. In others, legal 
incentives for the takedown of certain kinds of information produce 
regulatory effects.
Legal regimes in many countries protect freedom of expression, but all 
governments prohibit the publication and exchange of certain types of 
information. Additionally, “[m] any democracies now deploy national- 
level filtering systems through which all ISPs (or in some cases most 
major ones) are compelled to block designated lists of websites to 
address public concerns about … illegal activities conducted on the 
Internet” (MacKinnon 2012: 95). Typical subjects of legal prohibitions 
include child pornography, speech offering material assistance to 
terrorists, speech that infringes intellectual property rights, and speech 
ruled to be defamatory. Additionally, some countries prohibit the dissem-
ination of hate speech, and many set limits on the collection, dissemin-
ation, and processing of personal information, although data protection 
regimes vary considerably from country to country. There are good 
reasons for all these prohibitions, but each involves governments in 
decisions about what is or is not prohibited, and therefore raises the pos-
sibility of overbroad interpretation leading to censorship of other, nom-
inally protected expression. Such decisions necessarily have implications 
for the quality of social life and the possibilities for social progress.
In some situations, legal rules incentivize media infrastructure com-
panies to create notice- and- takedown mechanisms for removal 
of prohibited information. To create an additional, more consistent 
set of incentives for removal, many countries have enacted legisla-
tion that provides safe harbor from copyright infringement liability 
if procedures are followed for removal of unauthorized copyright- 
protected materials from publicly available websites and/ or exclu-
sion of such materials from search results. The first copyright safe 
harbor legislation was enacted by the United States as part of the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998.14 Similar provisions have 
been enacted in many other countries, often following inclusion of 
such obligations in bilateral or multilateral free trade agreements 
negotiated by the United States (Fink and Reichenmiller 2006; see also 
Valdes and McCann 2014). More recently, European legal instruments 
regarding privacy and data protection have been interpreted to afford 
enforceable rights to deindexing and erasure of information made 
available online.15 Those rulings have prompted some online infor-
mation providers, including most notably Google, to develop notice- 
and- takedown mechanisms patterned after the copyright model 
(Powles and Chaparro 2015). Such legal structures play important 
roles in shaping the “rules of the game” regarding information flow 
in daily life.
Meanwhile, governments in some regions have invested heavily in 
the development of technologies for regulating citizens’ informa-
tional activities more directly and on highly granular levels. South 
Korea, for example, for several years enforced a “real- name system” 
for internet access that prevented anonymous expression online. In 
2012, the Constitutional Court of Korea struck down the real- name 
requirements, ruling that they violated internet users’ freedom of 
speech.16 Automated content filtering of information supplied via 
media infrastructures is pervasive. Such filtering is often justified by 
asserted needs that parallel the reasons offered for direct speech 
prohibitions (e.g. protection against pornography, copyright infringe-
ment, and/ or defamation and harassment); in operation, however, it 
also seeks to police and deny access to content for political reasons 
(MacKinnon 2012).
On another level, not just governments but corporations (from 
Europe, North America, and Asia) are heavily involved in the building 
of media infrastructures, for example through the export of tech-
nologies to the Global South. Such infrastructures often include 
built- in capacities for censorship and surveillance. Chinese com-
panies export technologies similar to those developed to Communist 
Party specifications for domestic use (MacKinnon 2012). When the 
Zimbabwean government jammed shortwave broadcasts in the 
run- up to the 2005 elections, it was believed to have done so by 
using jamming equipment provided by China (Wu 2012). But North 
American and European companies such as Cisco also export infor-
mation technologies built to customer specification to enable infor-
mational control, and global platform companies have acceded to 
demands for censorship to gain access to local markets (Stirland 
2008; Wu 2012).
14 Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105– 304, Title II: Online Liability Limitation, 112 Stat. 2860, codified as amended at 17 USC. § 512.
15 Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos and Mario Costeja Gonzalez, No. C- 131/ 12, May 13, 2014.
16 Constitutional Court Decision 2010Hun- Ma47, August 23, 2012.
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13.3.2  The Shift From Formal to Informal Governance  
and the Rise of New Global/ Transnational 
Governance Institutions
Direct government mandates, prohibitions, and procurements are the 
most obvious mechanisms through which media infrastructures are 
governed, but other mechanisms are equally important. The emer-
gence of a networked information economy and the globalization of 
mediated information flows have catalyzed two significant shifts in 
the nature and quality of governance. The first is a shift away from 
formal government regulation toward informal and often highly 
corporatized governance mechanisms. The second is a shift away 
from state- based governance (and global governance institutions 
organized around state membership) toward transnational govern-
ance institutions more directly responsive to the asserted needs of 
private entities, often also corporations, that are those institutions’ 
“stakeholders.” Both trends, if they continue unabated, may result 
in a serious imbalance inconsistent with SDG 16, which calls for the 
building of “effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all 
levels.”
Particularly in the Global North but also the Global South, the 
information networks and communication protocols that underlie 
media infrastructures are designed and operated by private, cor-
porate entities. Direct technical authority over networks and 
protocols gives those entities an authority that is inherently regula-
tory. Global platform companies such as Google, Twitter, Facebook, 
Microsoft, and Apple, each of which occupies a dominant market 
position globally, enjoy correspondingly stronger and more perva-
sive regulatory power.
The regulatory effects of technology take a variety of forms and 
produce a variety of effects, some beneficial and others less so. For 
example, security measures designed to prevent unauthorized access to 
networks, servers, and accounts protect private, personal information, 
and important corporate and government information from prying eyes 
and malicious actors. Flawed or poorly implemented security measures 
can introduce vulnerabilities into the network, exposing individuals 
to identity theft, surveillance, censorship, and political persecution. 
Likewise, flawed or poorly implemented security measures can expose 
corporations, governments, and key power and communications 
infrastructures to espionage and cyberattack. But technical protections 
applied to media infrastructures and content flows can also have direct 
impacts on important aspects of social life: for example, affecting the 
information access necessary for education, self- development, cultural 
participation, informed voting, and open and democratic government 
(Citron 2008; Cohen 2012). Governance processes in relation to media 
infrastructures are therefore much more than a “technical” concern.
There are other examples of how media governance affects social life. 
Many platform companies (e.g. Google/ YouTube, Facebook, Twitter) 
employ filtering algorithms to remove or de- list content that infringes 
copyright and related rights. Such automated mechanisms for con-
tent removal tend to be over- inclusive, removing both material that 
is clearly infringing and material that would be covered by the various 
limitations and exceptions to copyright (Quilter and Urban 2005; see 
also United Nations 2011).
In addition, many platform companies employ predictive algorithms 
to determine what information to display to their users. In networked 
digital media and particularly for mobile applications, access to infor-
mation is comprehensively mediated by such algorithms, which process 
data collected from users, often in combination with data purchased 
from other information collectors and aggregators, and rely on what is 
known or inferred about users to generate correlations and predictions 
(Bolin 2011; Turow 2011). National security services engage in similar 
data collection and process, often sharing the results with one another 
and helping each other circumvent the restrictions that might apply to 
data collection and processing conducted within territorial boundaries 
(Privacy International 2013). Like the filtering algorithms used for con-
tent monitoring, the predictive algorithms used in commercial contexts 
are maintained as proprietary trade secrets, while their counterparts 
on the intelligence side are maintained as state secrets. In both cases, 
secrecy frustrates efforts to document and understand the effects of such 
filtering processes on the flow of daily life and on everyday freedoms 
(Cohen 2012; Pasquale 2015).
The relationships between governments and the corporate entities that 
exercise alternative forms of governance over media infrastructures 
are complex and often contested. For governments seeking greater 
regulatory authority over media infrastructures, the control exercised 
by corporate entities presents an obvious target for regulatory inter-
vention (Birnhack and Elkin- Koren 2006; MacKinnon 2012; United 
Nations 2011). In China, for example, the coordination between state 
and private governance is relatively tight, fueled by close ties between 
the state/ communist party and IT conglomerates.
In North America and Europe, by contrast, the interplay of state 
and private governance mechanisms is more complicated. There 
are powerful pressures to comply with government demands for 
access to information for law enforcement and national security 
purposes, as the Snowden revelations showed. In the wake of 
those revelations, however, some companies, including most not-
ably Apple, have redesigned their products and services to offer 
users greater privacy for their communications with each other 
(though, as we discuss in Section 13.3.3, they have continued to 
collect other data streams for predictive targeting) and have more 
aggressively resisted government demands for access (Powles and 
Chaparro 2016; Yadron 2016).
Outside the law enforcement context, dynamics tend to be some-
what different, and reflect a greater perceived alignment of state 
and private interests. For example, US companies that engage in 
collection and processing of personal information often count gov-
ernment entities among their customers (Hoofnagle 2004), and have 
looked to the US government to protect their economic interests in 
relation to claims for stronger privacy and data protection regula-
tion. European information companies, for their part, value cross- 
border trade but also look to the European Union for protection 
against US- based rivals. With regard to private economic rights in 
information, copyright safe harbour legislation effectively positions 
corporate information businesses as the regulators of first resort. So 
far, however, efforts to impose in law parallel takedown obligations 
on payment providers and domain name system registrars have not 
succeeded.
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The second shift described in this section  – from state- based to 
transnational governance – involves two types of transnational gov-
ernance institutions:  trade dispute resolution bodies and technical 
standards bodies, in both of which the relative regulatory influence 
of corporations is growing. The global trade system has become a key 
mechanism through which both nation- states and powerful corporate 
actors pursue their interests in regulating media infrastructures and 
controlling information flows. Many completed global, regional, 
and bilateral trade agreements  – and many others currently under 
negotiation  – contain key provisions dealing with recognition and 
enforcement of intellectual property rights and with flows of data 
and information services across borders (Calabrese and Briziarelli 
2011; Freedman 2003). Although trade agreements typically contain 
provisions exempting protections for public health, environmental 
protection, and privacy rights from designation as nontariff barriers,17 
the extent of those exemptions is unclear and their scope contested 
(Public Citizen 2015a). Arbitral proceedings alleging violations of 
trade agreements therefore may work at cross purposes with efforts 
by domestic legislatures and courts and international human rights 
tribunals to set appropriate limits on right- holder control of informa-
tion and on the collection, processing, and use of personal informa-
tion to sort and categorize individuals and communities.
Meanwhile, technical standards bodies have attained increasing prom-
inence and power. Networked digital communications operate via 
information transfer protocols. Such protocols determine the resources 
to which individuals and communities have access and, depending 
on their design, may enable particular types of surveillance or afford 
bottlenecks at which state or corporate regulatory authority can be 
brought to bear (DeNardis 2014; MacKinnon 2012). Those protocols 
are the responsibility of an interlocking network of global standards 
bodies, including the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), 
the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), 
and the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). These bodies have 
different charges and varying degrees of connection to more trad-
itional governance institutions.
For example, the ITU, which oversees standardization and implementa-
tion of a variety of protocols for telecommunication, broadcasting, and 
data transfer, is overseen by the United Nations and representation is 
state- based, whereas the ICANN, which oversees the Internet naming 
and addressing protocols and maintains a dispute resolution system 
for resolving trademark- related domain name disputes, is a standalone 
corporate body chartered under the laws of California, with policies set 
by an elected board of directors.
In these multiple ways, the ability of national governments, and indir-
ectly national civil societies, to influence the workings of media in 
everyday life (through governance structures) has been challenged 
by the cross- cutting ability of corporate interests to impose govern-
ance through other means. In considering the potential implications of 
media for social progress we need therefore to take into account this 
underlying shift in regulatory power.
13.3.3  The Ambiguous Implications of Media- Based 
Governance for Social Progress
For citizens, networked digital media infrastructures may lower the 
costs of access to knowledge and enable new forms of participation 
in social, cultural, and economic life (see Section 13.5). At the same 
time, however, citizens’ access to many important informational and 
cultural resources is subject to control by neo- authoritarian states 
and by information intermediaries of various sorts, including internet 
access providers, search engines, mobile applications developers, 
and designers of proprietary media ecosystems. Such control often 
materially affects the level and quality of access. The implications for 
social progress are clearest when particular materials are blocked or 
removed, but mediated access also produces a range of other effects, 
which may or may not be consistent with SDG 9 concerning the con-
struction of “resilient infrastructures” and the promotion of “inclusive 
and sustainable industrialization.”
The increasingly global regime for intellectual property protection 
both incentivizes worldwide distribution of informational and cultural 
resources and creates additional barriers for those seeking access to such 
resources. As already suggested in Section 13.2.5, licensing requirements 
for access to educational, professional, and technical materials can be 
onerous and the need to pay recurring fees for continued access to 
digitalized resources (rather than, for example, purchasing hard copies 
to which one may enjoy permanent access) disproportionately burdens 
public institutions and lower- resourced communities. In the Global South, 
the costs of access to copyrighted materials can render access infeasible 
even for educational institutions and libraries (Chon 2007; Okediji 2004, 
2006). In addition, a 1967 Berne Convention protocol governing trans-
lation rights is not widely used because its protections are difficult for 
developing countries to invoke. Among other things, the protocol requires 
that a compulsory licensing system be fully implemented in domestic 
law and does not make adequate provision for minority languages.18 The 
Global South has adopted a variety of ad hoc solutions, but the lack of a 
clear framework often stymies efforts to make informational and cultural 
works available to global audiences that are linguistically and culturally 
diverse (Cerda Silva 2012).
In many parts of the world and for large parts of the population, 
everyday life routinely involves online access to a wide variety of 
purveyors of news, information, and popular culture, as well as search 
engines, social networking platforms, and other content aggregators 
that seek to help users find, organize, and make sense of it all. Access 
to these resources may be offered at no financial cost to users on 
an advertiser- supported basis, but often such access has a price, in 
the form of the automated collection of information about personal 
reading, viewing, and listening habits (Hoofnagle and Whittington 
2014). Such information can be used both to target advertising and to 
suggest content more likely to appeal to each user.
Such predictive targeting of information access has a number of troub-
ling economic and political implications. Algorithms for predictive 
17 See, for example, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XX: General Exceptions, www.wto.org/ english/ docs_ e/ legal_ e/ gatt47_ 02_ e.htm#articleXX; General Agreement 
on Trade in Services, art. XIV: General Exceptions, www.wto.org/ english/ res_ e/ booksp_ e/ analytic_ index_ e/ gats_ 02_ e.htm#article14.
18 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Appendix art. II, www.wipo.int/ treaties/ en/ text.jsp?file_ id=283698#P421_ 79913.
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targeting based on data about personal habits and preferences 
necessarily enable the identification of population segments sorted 
by, for example, race/ nationality, cultural background, religious affili-
ation, socioeconomic status, and political preferences. Commercially, 
targeting based on such indicators raises the prospect of invidious 
discrimination in the distribution of goods and services, in decisions 
about employment and credit, and in myriad other ways (Barocas and 
Selbst 2016; Robinson and Yu 2014). The ability to conduct relatively 
granular price discrimination over those goods and services, in ways 
that deprive ordinary individuals of choice and corresponding market-
place leverage, sits in tension with free- market ideologies and raises 
profound distributive justice questions (Cohen 2015).
Turning to politics, micro- targeting of media content and political 
appeals that align with (inferences about) recipients’ preexisting 
inclinations creates the prospect of an “echo chamber” or “filter 
bubble” effect, through which preexisting inclinations become 
reinforced and public opinion about political and cultural issues 
becomes correspondingly polarized (Pariser 2011; Sunstein 2009).19 
Individuals themselves can come to rely on filtering processes to sim-
plify the information environment and reduce information overload 
(Andrejevic 2013). In an era in which descriptions of policy problems 
increasingly are subject to expert mediation – as with climate change 
or the global financial crisis  – the filter bubble effect can work to 
entrench beliefs in ways that are highly resistant to scientific challenge 
or debunking (Andrejevic 2013:  12– 18, 42– 61, 113– 132). This can 
undermine efforts to mobilize popular and political support for action 
toward social progress on various fronts (environmental sustainability, 
financial accountability, and so on).
A final set of ambiguities concerns the newly prominent transnational 
governance institutions described in Section  13.3.2. Governance of 
media infrastructures and information flows via trade and technical 
standards bodies provides harmonization that many argue is essen-
tial in an increasingly interconnected world. But the new trans-
national governance institutions are accountable neither to national 
governments nor to traditional international governance institutions, 
and many lack robust democratic traditions of their own. Participation 
in such institutions may be perceived as offering opportunities for 
powerful national and/ or commercial interests to avoid roadblocks 
interposed by domestic regulation, by the international human rights 
framework, and by civil society groups (Benvenisti 2015). Within the 
global trade system, both negotiation and dispute resolution processes 
are highly responsive to corporate interests yet much less responsive 
to other interests. Trade dispute resolution panels convened by the 
World Trade Organization have, to date, ruled against states asserting 
protective regulation in all but one of the cases in which domestic 
protective regulations have been challenged (Public Citizen 2015a). In 
recent rounds of negotiation over high- profile multilateral agreements 
such as the Trans Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership, trade associations representing corporate 
interests have enjoyed privileged access to country- level negotiators 
and working drafts, while civil society groups and interested members 
of the public have been allowed only brief glimpses of later- stage 
documents, and only on condition of confidentiality.20 Technical 
standards bodies, meanwhile, are only gradually coming to terms with 
their own role as governance bodies (DeNardis 2009, 2014; MacKinnon 
2012: 203– 219).
The result is a landscape of everyday media consumption configured 
by forces that are increasingly in tension with shared flows of infor-
mation and open, inclusive development. The multiple overlapping 
processes for governing media’s underlying infrastructures are ever 
more secretive and resistant to civil society influence. This is the 
complex starting point for thinking about two important potential 
contributions of media and communications to social progress:  the 
role of journalism in the production of public knowledge (Section 13.4) 
and the role of networked communications in enabling new forms of 
citizenship (Section 13.5).
13.4  Journalism and Public Knowledge
One key way in which media can contribute to social progress over the 
long term is through the provision of public knowledge (Sen 1999). 
The term “public knowledge” refers to the resources that citizens have 
for forming informed opinions about matters of public and general 
interest. Journalism has for centuries been a key institutional form for 
disseminating such knowledge.
13.4.1  Public Knowledge for Democracy and  
Social Progress
Digital media infrastructures create new opportunities for the dissem-
ination of public knowledge. Although the decline in civic participation 
in established democratic societies has been widely lamented (Putnam 
2000), other observers (Dahlgren 2009; Lewis, Inthorn, and Wahl- 
Jorgensen 2005) have pointed to the growth of new communities online 
and the growth in quantity and diversity in communication platforms 
outside of the traditional news media, where citizens can exchange infor-
mation and participate in political debate. Additionally, whereas public 
knowledge traditionally was disseminated through news and informa-
tion in the press, radio, and television, social networking platforms are 
becoming a major news source for citizens. A recent survey conducted 
in the United States found that 44 percent of respondents get their daily 
news from social media (IPSP 2017). The question of citizenship is com-
plex, and cannot be dealt with at length here: we note, however, that 
large parts of the world’s population live without citizenship, and citi-
zenship in a nation- state does not protect citizens from rights- affecting 
actions controlled by institutions outside of the nation- state.
Early research on public knowledge overemphasized news distribution 
and correspondingly undervalued other sources of information, such 
as popular culture and entertainment (Corner 1991). Both sources of 
information can contribute to the formation of public knowledge and 
to social progress, as can be appreciated when we consider the polit-
ical and cultural aspects of citizenship. Where political citizenship deals 
19 In the United States, practices of political microtargeting are becoming widespread. See Beckett (2012).
20 See, for example, Inman (2016), Schneider (2014).
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with issues related to the formal rights (and duties) of citizens, and is 
most often mediated by traditional categories of news about current 
affairs and politics, cultural citizenship deals with questions of recog-
nition, identity, and the cultural rights (and duties) of citizens, and is 
mediated by various sorts of information that circulate in the cultural 
public sphere.
The distinction between political and cultural citizenship may become 
more blurred when the convergence of entertainment media and pol-
itical citizenship is taken seriously (Hermes 2005; Van Zoonen 2005; 
Williams and Delli Carpini 2011). The rise of bots and algorithmic man-
agement of information introduces additional distortions of public 
deliberation (Tambini 2017). But none of this potential to create public 
knowledge matters if media content produced by an elite “profes-
sional” class of journalists does not resonate with audiences’ everyday 
lived experience. Today various factors point in that direction, both in 
forms of propaganda and destabilizing communicative practices and in 
problems within systems of education, where much of the socializing 
of citizens take place (SPI “Access to basic knowledge”).
In this section we outline, first, the special roles that journalism plays 
in public knowledge, and so why journalism is important for democ-
racy and social progress. We will then give examples of the various 
“soft” and “hard” threats that we identify as detrimental to public 
knowledge, including both changes in business models, news recep-
tion, and new forms of “information management,” and, more directly, 
various physical threats against news production, and journalists in 
conflict areas and unstable democracies. Third, we will point to areas 
where there are opportunities for countering this negative picture, 
for example the rise of citizen journalism and alternative media. We 
end this section with a double case study of organized attempts to 
construct alternative journalistic narratives in Latin America and the 
Middle East.
13.4.2  The Special Functions of Journalism and 
Journalistic Practice
Journalism is still associated, especially in the established democracies 
of the Global North, with the institutions and practices of democracy 
(Fenton 2010: 3). There are many examples, both historical and current, 
of how journalism has contributed to public knowledge for social pro-
gress (SDG 16). These include, for example, the antislavery campaigns 
that benefited from press assistance with the formation of abolitionist 
organizations (King and Haveman 2008), samizdat publications in the 
former Soviet Union (Feldbrugge 1975), information about environ-
mental disasters such as the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident that 
was spread not only by mainstream journalists but also by citizens on 
blogging and social media platforms (Friedman 2011), or the role of 
the underground press in the struggle against apartheid (Switzer and 
Adhikari 2000). For these reasons the contribution of journalism to 
public knowledge remains an important reference point in the broader 
context of global social progress.
The emergence of digital media infrastructures has had profound 
implications for traditional conceptions of news and journalism. These 
include a proliferation of the channels through which journalism is 
produced and consumed, and a blurring of the lines between news 
and entertainment through the rise of formats such as the “mocku-
mentary,” “docudrama,” and satirical news. The participatory potential 
of digital technologies, aided by the widespread accessibility of tech-
nologies such as the mobile phone, has challenged previous claims 
by professional journalists to exclusivity in the purveying of news. 
Additionally, the business models for journalism have undergone a 
fundamental transformation in recent years, even as new opportun-
ities have arisen for the creation of public knowledge and citizen par-
ticipation in the construction of knowledge and public debate.
Against the background of rapid change, however, the expectation that 
news journalism will contribute to public knowledge, the monitoring of 
power, and the facilitation of public debate remains an ideal against 
which communication practices continue to be measured. The mere 
fact that information is publicly disseminated and available does not 
automatically result in an informed public. Additionally, in the con-
text of changing frameworks of reception, citizens’ ability to orientate 
themselves in today’s increasingly complex media landscape, drawing 
perhaps on the skills provided by education, are ever more important.
13.4.3  Threats to Public Knowledge 1: System Pressures
The digitization and marketization of media (discussed in Section 13.2) 
have affected the institutional conditions for journalistic production. 
New economic conditions have led the news industries into a down-
ward spiral where it has become ever more difficult to charge for con-
tent. In a recent survey conducted by the IPSP in the United States, 
57 percent of respondents do not like to pay for news, and believe 
news should be freely accessible to all (IPSP 2017). Shrinking reader-
ship makes advertisers abandon print media to the benefit of online 
search and social networking.
The old business models of journalism are collapsing, and news 
producers have had to rethink their relation to audiences, leading 
in turn to changes in journalistic practice. New forms of “click- bait 
journalism,” robot journalism, and algorithmically steered news pro-
duction are increasingly common. These follow different logics from 
traditional journalism, and in their most extreme forms may produce 
echo chambers or filter bubbles (see Section 13.3) that in the long 
run fragment public debate and the public sphere more generally. The 
automated search for audiences through data processing also may fur-
ther marginalize those audiences who are already on the margins of 
the public sphere. In countries where access to the digital public sphere 
mirrors huge social and economic equalities  – for instance South 
Africa, India, China, and Brazil – these new practices could exacerbate 
such inequalities.
The reorganization of media production into large- scale media 
corporations with interests also in non- journalistic media produc-
tion has meant that even financially successful journalistic and public 
knowledge operations cannot always reinvest their profits into news 
production, but instead have their profits reinvested in other activities. 
This lack of economic control makes it difficult to sustain long- term 
strategies of news production. While there has always been a tension 
between editorial and management teams within news organizations, 
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large- scale media corporations shift economic decision- making farther 
away from news production environments, resulting in managerial 
decisions that direct journalistic practice from the outside.
There are also regulative threats to independent news media produc-
tion, for example the noncommercial and license fee funded public 
service media. In Europe, the traditional freedom of public service 
broadcasters to choose their policy orientations has come under attack 
by newly powerful private broadcasters (SPI “Press freedom”). One 
result is the public value test instigated by the European Commission, 
which emerged from private broadcasters’ intense lobbying efforts in 
relation to the European Commission (Donders and Moe 2011).
While online (including mobile) media have created new platforms for 
social agency and public participation, both in the creation of “user- 
generated content” (UGC) for mainstream media and in providing 
outlets for alternative news and views, the Internet has also become 
a space where reactionary views, racist representations, and hate 
speech can thrive. Social media like Facebook and Twitter contribute 
to the proliferation of this kind of communication. Misunderstandings 
of complex matters and online “lynch mobs” illustrate the volatility 
of networked digital media environments and offer testimony to the 
limits of social media for public debate. On a more fundamental level, 
well- meaning educational initiatives to foster “digital literacy” might 
produce relativistic approaches to scientific and social truths (Boyd 
2017), and the journalistic ideals of balance of opinion might privilege 
a blurring of the distinction between facts and opinions, and where 
“truth” becomes more of an affective mood.
13.4.4  Threats to Public Knowledge 2: Coercive Force
Meanwhile, journalists can face harder forms of threat, whether 
through legal frameworks (press freedom or its opposite) or informal 
threats (through damage to journalists’ physical and psychological 
security): these threats may exist separately or in combination.
In many parts of the world, growing political instability has affected 
journalism‘s ability to fulfil its broader public knowledge goals because 
of direct threats to press freedom (see SPI “Press Freedom”). For 
example, in some parts of Eastern Europe, political polarization has 
arisen as some post- Soviet states have sought closer ties with the 
EU. The Ukraine– Russia conflict is one, widely reported, outgrowth of 
this polarization, but the phenomenon is also visible in other post- 
Soviet countries (Richter 2015). Information warfare is on the rise, 
not only in the region itself, but also in international news media (for 
example, via TV channels such as Russia Today and Ukraine Today 
[Miazhevich 2014]). Initiatives for disinformation and propaganda/ 
counterpropaganda, including so- called “troll- factories” maintained in 
Russia (and elsewhere),21 make efforts to enhance public knowledge 
increasingly difficult. The sheer amount of seemingly contradictory infor-
mation circulating puts high pressure on audiences’ critical abilities (the 
much discussed phenomenon of “fake news“). A recent example of this 
from the Ukraine– Russia conflict is the overload of contradictory infor-
mation that surrounded the shooting down of Malaysian flight MH17 
over eastern Ukraine in 2014, and the sharply divergent accounts that 
circulated on the Internet both before and after the Dutch Safety Board 
published their report of the crash.22 Similar dynamics have emerged in 
the Middle East, leading to an increasingly polarized and propaganda- 
dominated public sphere (see Section 13.4.6).
In many African countries also, journalism for public knowledge 
remains an ideal rather than a practical reality. In the Windhoek 
Declaration on Promoting an Independent and Pluralistic African Press 
(UNESCO 1991), African journalists invoked the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights as a motivation for the promotion of press freedom. 
At the same time, however, African resistance to colonialism and rejec-
tion of cultural imperialism engendered an insistence on “African 
values” in journalism, couched in the discourse of development but 
often implying uncritical and loyalist media support of postcolonial 
states. An example of an appeal to “African values” is Francis Kasoma’s 
(1994, 1996) notion of “Afriethics,” which rejects Western normative 
frameworks and counterposes an African value system that privileges 
communalism and an orientation towards the family and clan over 
individualism. Appeals to “African values” have often been criticized 
for their tendency to essentialize African culture and identity, without 
acknowledging the interpenetration of African and Western values in 
a globalized context (Banda 2009; Skjerdal 2012). Additionally, such 
appeals have served to justify repression of media freedom in many 
African countries (see Bourgault 1995; Karikari 2007).
Lastly, against the background of political instability, propaganda wars, 
and state repression, violence against journalists has also increased. 
Some examples include: Egypt clamping down on journalists, activists, 
and civil society; the consolidation of electoral autocracy and tem-
porary closure of digital platforms in Turkey; and repressive measures 
from verbal threats to physical assaults and imprisonment in various 
African countries. In Poland, a new legal regime has circumscribed the 
freedom for journalists, making critical and investigative journalism 
more difficult and precarious.23
13.4.5  Opportunities for Public Knowledge: New Forms  
of Journalism and Citizens’ Media
Meanwhile, digital media infrastructures have enabled the growth of 
new forms of citizen- created media for the production of public know-
ledge. In many African contexts where legacy media like newspapers 
and radio stations are owned and controlled by the state, digital media 
platforms have served as alternative outlets for the dissemination of 
news, political debate, and critique (Paterson 2013). In Zimbabwe, 
Facebook has provided users with more freedom to engage in pol-
itical satire and offer alternative accounts of political developments 
(Mare 2014). The widespread penetration and use of mobile media in 
Africa have also provided users with a tool to engage more actively 
with mainstream news agendas. An example of this was the mobile 
21 See www.theguardian.com/ world/ 2015/ aug/ 18/ trolls- putin- russia- savchuk or www.theguardian.com/ world/ 2015/ apr/ 02/ putin- kremlin- inside- russian- troll- house.
22 See www.onderzoeksraad.nl/ .
23 See www.bbc.com/ news/ world- europe- 35257105.
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phone footage of police brutality against a Mozambican immigrant, 
Mido Macia, in Daveyton, South Africa. The footage of police dragging 
Macia, cuffed to a police vehicle, was captured by a bystander and 
sent to the tabloid the Daily Sun, who posted the video online and 
reported on it. The video went viral and made headlines internationally 
after Macia died in police custody, and led to the arrest and convic-
tion of the police officers. This integration of citizen journalism, legacy 
media (especially tabloids), and online platforms such as Youtube or 
Facebook, has provided journalists and news consumers with new 
ways of creating public knowledge and serving the public interest.
In South Korea, citizen journalists have used digital networks for produ-
cing alternative civic discourses and for mobilizing enormous rallies of 
citizens to speak out on socially sensitive issues. More recently, social 
media have given rise to new alternative media such as Newstapa 
(“Rebuilding Investigative Journalism”) launched in January 2012. Due 
to the government’s control over public broadcasting, some former 
employees of the major TV networks and other small- sized production 
team members have come together to produce an investigative news 
program about social issues. Newstapa uses a variety of online outlets 
such as its own webpage views, YouTube clips, and podcast episodes, 
and the younger generations download and watch its weekly episodes 
using their smartphones. Social media also play a key role in spreading 
the news program’s schedule and in enabling public fundraising to 
support production. Newstapa has gained a reputation as an influen-
tial news provider and as illustrating how, through regular practices of 
collaboration, citizens can build alternative paradigms of social justice 
against mainstream media and power elites.
Meanwhile, during the political turmoil and violence following the 
ousting of former President Yanukovich in Ukraine, faculty and students 
from the Mohyla School of Journalism in Kyiv created StopFake 
(stopfake.org), an organization aimed at debunking Russian propa-
ganda and the distorted news produced by troll- factories. Another civic 
initiative formed during the political turmoil was The Ukraine Crisis 
Media Centre, which is a platform for information management that 
arranges press briefings with representatives of the Ukrainian military 
and government (Bolin, Jordan, and Ståhlberg 2016).
There are therefore many overlapping factors shaping media’s possible 
contribution to public knowledge in different parts of the world today. 
In the next part of this section, we offer a double case study from Latin 
America and the Middle East that considers the possibilities of building 
new infrastructures for journalism that can offer alternative voices to 
counter perceived dominant narratives.
13.4.6  Double Case Study: TeleSUR and Al- 
Jazeera: Alternative Voices in Global News
The Venezuelan channel TeleSUR and the Qatari channel Al- Jazeera 
are often hailed as models of media with global reach that have 
challenged the North Atlantic domination of global news flows and 
reference points. These two channels have much in common:  they 
were both made possible by the large political ambitions of their 
founders; both faced indifference or hostility in the world’s power 
centers; and both evolved from single channels into multiplatform 
networks. This section explores what can be learned from their 
contrasting achievements.
13.4.6.1 TeleSUR
Sponsored by the left- leaning government of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela 
(1999– 2013), TeleSUR was formed in 2005 as a regional television net-
work with the goal of broadcasting “from the South to the South” (Da 
Silva Mendes 2012). TeleSUR’s achievements can only be understood 
against the history of media concentration and economic exploitation 
achieved by elites in Latin America since the eighteenth century. From 
the inception of electronic media, upper classes have controlled the 
media and used them to advance their own political and financial 
interests, at the exclusion of the interests of working- class majorities. 
Through control of commercial and public media, political and eco-
nomic elites secured ideological control over, and the opportunity to 
profit from, mass audiences.
Former Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez created TeleSUR as a televi-
sion network that would prioritize the information and communication 
needs of the oppressed majorities in the region and disseminate an 
autonomous Latin American perspective. Drawing explicitly from the 
language of the NWICO, TeleSUR defines itself as “a Latin American 
multimedia initiative dedicated to promoting unity among the peoples 
of the South; a space and a voice for the development of a new com-
munication order” (www.teleSURtv.net). It defines “the South” as a 
“geopolitical concept that promotes the people’s struggle for peace 
and self- determination and respect for human rights and social 
justice.” TeleSUR has had two different goals: to offer an alternative 
to US and European news media, (e.g. BBC or CNN); and to shape a 
unified Latin American public sphere (Cañizalez and Lugo 2007). It is 
not a coincidence that TeleSUR emerged in 2005 at the same time that 
the region shifted to the left. Its slogan – “Nuestro norte es el Sur” 
(Our North is the South) – embodies this shift in perspective, and is 
evidenced by its coverage of key historical events such as the bom-
bardment of Colombian FARC guerrilla camps by the military, or the 
demise of Gaddafi’s government in Libya.
TeleSUR is cofinanced by various governments in Latin America (Da 
Silva Mendes 2012). Some Latin American analysts suggest that 
TeleSUR is more the loudspeaker of “Chavismo” (the political platform 
of late Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez) than a pan- Latin American 
voice (Moraes 2011), but TeleSUR makes an important contribution 
to public knowledge:  information and news make up 80  percent of 
TeleSUR’s programming and the rest centers on renowned Latin 
American personalities (Da Silva Mendes 2012; Rincón in press). In 
2009 TeleSUR grew into a multimedia platform with a strong presence 
online and its own distribution system. TeleSUR currently has five 
satellites covering parts of Europe and the Americas, as well as the 
Middle East and North Africa.
13.4.6.2 Al- Jazeera
Al- Jazeera, the original Arabic- language channel, was formed in late 
1996, following the break- up of BBC Arabic. It was founded by Hamad 
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bin- Khalifa Al Thani to free Qatar from the influence of its larger 
neighbor, Saudi Arabia, and give the country a regional and global 
influence disproportionate to its small size.
Al- Jazeera’s unbridled news coverage quickly offended Arab leaders 
accustomed to deference and Western powers unused to having 
their narratives of global affairs challenged. By early 2004, the gov-
ernment of Qatar had received more than 500 complaints from Arab 
governments focusing on Al- Jazeera (Lamloum 2004:  20). Originally 
hailed as a beacon of free speech by the West, Al- Jazeera became 
vilified as the loudspeaker of Al- Qaeda following the September 11, 
2001 attacks. The channel became a global household name in the 
wake of the Anglo- American invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in 
2001 and 2003, when its deep coverage was reused by Western news 
organizations.
In the following years, Al- Jazeera grew from a single channel to a 
network of multiple channels, including Al- Jazeera English, a training 
center, and online platforms. The Arabic- language Al- Jazeera’s edi-
torial line was sympathetic to the centrist Islamism of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, to the Palestinian cause, and to the Global South. Some of 
these issues carried over into Al- Jazeera English, whose editorial line has 
significant overlap with TeleSUR’s. Al- Jazeera English became a major 
global news player, with broadcast bureaus in Doha, London, New York, 
and Kuala Lumpur, and dozens of offices and correspondents world-
wide. Al- Jazeera, however, faced problems from its inception regarding 
repeated political pressure to restrain its editorial line, internal frictions 
(Zahreddin 2011), and a conflict between two factions – one secular 
and Arab nationalist, the other Islamist and sympathetic to the Muslim 
Brotherhood (Kraidy and Khalil 2009; Talon 2011).
Al- Jazeera shifted its editorial line with the onset of the Arab uprisings in 
2010. In Egypt, the channel supported the Muslim Brotherhood against 
Mubarak. In Syria, it also sided with the rebels against Assad. Although 
Al- Jazeera and Qatar gained some ground as a supporter of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, ensuing political shifts, driven by rapprochement 
between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, undermined Al- Jazeera’s status as a 
news outlet that challenged dominant news agendas.
* * * * *
The contrasting cases of TeleSUR and Al- Jazeera illustrate both the 
opportunities for and the potential vulnerabilities of attempts to create 
public knowledge outlets from outside the Global North that have influ-
ence on a global scale. Such outlets can be established and have sig-
nificant success, provided strong initial funding and support exists, but 
they remain vulnerable to the wider political influences that may lie 
behind their funding. That vulnerability, however, should not be seen 
in isolation from the vulnerabilities to political influence that commer-
cially funded media outlets also face in many other parts of the world.
13.5  Networked Communications: Possibilities 
for Citizenship
We have argued in Section 13.4 that media’s potential contribution 
to social progress through public knowledge faces significant threats 
but, in a digital age characterized by an increasingly global media 
infrastructure, brings important opportunities too. In this section, we 
consider how citizens make use of the informational and imaginative 
materials that media provide to them.
13.5.1  Relations Between Media and Spaces  
of Citizenship
Today’s new density of global communication not only enables con-
tinuous interaction across world regions, but also is beginning to shape 
new spheres of civic communication on every scale. Communication 
interfaces (from WhatsApp to WeChat) offer a new architecture of 
civic discourse that is no longer merely national or international: the 
resulting spaces where citizens interact are shaped not by the media 
spheres of particular territories but by individuals’ choices of what to 
follow online. Furthermore, these networked spheres of civil commu-
nication are no longer accessible only in the Global North but engage 
citizens – with internet access – from all types of societies, including 
so- called failed states. Through this, media become involved in opening 
up new spaces of citizenship (SDG 16.7).
Although citizenship is national and the boundedness of state terri-
tory continues, communication is shaping a new form of civic identity, 
which is increasingly embedded in a globalized digital space. Rather 
than globalization operating outside and against the national, “the 
nation is the site of globalization” (Sassen 2007: 80, emphasis added). 
Today this merging of national and global takes different shapes in 
different societies. Even secluded states such as North Korea and 
failed states such as Syria, Somalia, and Afghanistan have their own 
modes of nation- based globalization. However, the point is particularly 
important in relation to public civic communication where national 
and global public spheres merge, and public deliberations, legitimacy, 
and accountability no longer develop solely through national debates. 
Rather, in contexts of climate change, governments are held account-
able based on broader global discourses.
As with the history of media (Section 13.2), these developments are still 
mainly considered from the perspective of nations in the Global North, 
with narratives often not looking beyond Western communications 
theory and research (Farivar 2011). Similarly, accounts of diaspora’s 
use of media often ignore political connectivity between expatriates of 
the Global South that link back to civic discourse in their countries of 
origin. The roles of nongovernmental actors in failed states and civic 
communications in post- conflict resolution constitute other examples 
of new forms of connection between citizens across borders. Citizens 
of the Global South such as forced migrants are communicating out-
side national media territories (Witteborn 2015). Networks of activism, 
deliberation, and mobilization, not possible in the past, are emerging 
whereby media provide new infrastructures of citizenship as part of 
what the MacBride report called the “many voices” of “one world.”
Section 13.2 discussed the historical dominance of communica-
tion flows from the Global North, linked to colonial communication 
infrastructures and extended by satellite communication infrastructures 
emerging in the 1970s for the delivery of broadcasting content and, 
since the 1990s, for individual media reception. For most of the 
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twentieth century, the globalized “stretching” of human interactions 
through media  – the “intensification of worldwide social relations 
which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are 
shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa” (Giddens 
1990: 64) – was, in its framing, dominated by news channels from the 
Global North, such as BBC, CNN, and Deutsche Welle, with few oppor-
tunities to contest it.
This situation has changed significantly since the second half of the 
1990s due to three interrelated processes:  the emergence of digital 
satellite platforms enabling the delivery of no longer just a few but 
hundreds of channels, the reduction of uplink costs for broadcasters, and 
the availability of cheap direct- to- home rooftop dishes. Furthermore, 
and most importantly, new regional media players have challenged 
the monopoly of political “breaking news” in times of world conflict. 
Such news is often delivered “live” worldwide and has influenced 
national foreign policy imperatives in various countries (Robinson 
2005; Volkmer 1999), contesting the framing of world events by media 
corporations from the Global North (see also Section 13.4.6). Whereas 
CNN produced the only narrative of the first Gulf War (1990– 1991) for 
a world audience, now there are hundreds of satellite news channels 
from the wider Arabic region, from Sudan, Pakistan, Tanzania, and at 
least 50 channels dedicated to news from India, South Korea, China, 
Mexico, and Brazil. In addition, some region- wide news channels, such 
as Channel News Asia and Africa 24, are available in several languages 
and target neighboring regions.
The resulting digital ecology for civic participation has two additional 
key characteristics. The first is the increasingly complex flow of media 
and information organized not just by media organizations, but by 
citizens’ own efforts to upload or recirculate what interests them. 
It is a transnational public space, which enables a new density of 
communication between citizens. The results of such dense peer- to- 
peer civic communication may include attempts to influence individ-
uals through hate speech (Phillips 2015), fake news and “bots” (see 
IPSP Chapter 10; IPSP Chapter 13 Toolkit “Knowledge as Commons” 
Column 2). At the same time, new forms of “reflective interdepend-
ence” (Volkmer 2014) may emerge whereby, through the sharing 
of reference points across borders, citizens acquire a new basis for 
shared political debate or activism on topics ranging from climate 
change, human rights violations, and crisis communication to polit-
ical campaigns such as the “Occupy” movement. Under these new 
conditions, civic engagement no longer occurs in one “place,” but 
across a network of places.
Although only a minority of the population is engaged in these 
new global networks, “their contribution to democracy cannot be 
underestimated” (Frere and Kiyindou 2009:  77, 79). In many coun-
tries, state monopolies on the inflow of foreign news are no longer 
possible. For example, it can be argued that African governments have 
“hardly any grip on the choices of the Internet user- consumer, who 
can freely choose the information that is interesting or useful and 
decide to join a particular ‘virtual community’ ” (Frere and Kiyindou 
2009:  78). This flexibility in the resources available through online 
media, including information and deliberation accessed across 
borders (Bohman 2007), potentially changes citizens’ horizons of civic 
engagement.
13.5.2  New Forms of Communicative Citizenship: The 
Case of Global Youth
As an example of these emerging trends, young citizens in many coun-
tries are engaging with each other in unprecedented ways, in peer- 
to- peer interaction within and across borders. In order to assess the 
implications of these new digital ecologies for civic identity, we need 
to consider the interaction between local and global media practices 
and information flows.
The density of these interactions is revealed in an international compara-
tive study on “Global Youth and Media, Notions of Cosmopolitanism 
in the Global Public Space” (discussed in Volkmer 2014). The study 
included more than 6,000 young people aged 14– 17 in nine coun-
tries on five continents. The study asked how they use media, how 
they construct globalization, and perceive civic identity. The distinctive 
uses of local, national, and global media by particular generations 
have been little researched. While national television is the general 
population’s preferred medium for political news, young people find 
news in parallel ways through Google news, MSN, and Yahoo. Across 
all society types, this younger generation mixes local and global infor-
mation flows in a distinctive way that entitles them to the label of “in- 
betweeners.” As a result, they consider themselves between skepticism 
and trust, between a realistic appreciation of global risks (indeed a 
strong sense of world insecurity) and the need for leadership. When 
asked if they feel that the world today has become more insecure 
since their parents were young, 80 percent agree. Yet more than half 
consider international political events more important than national 
and so seem to live out their citizenship on two connected scales, 
national and global. They distrust politicians and engage in global pol-
itical spheres characterized by global themes such as “environment,” 
“human rights,” and “economy, wealth, and poverty.”
A Mexican sociologist describes in the context of Central America the 
implications of such an engagement for local citizenship:  “the pro-
test movements with a global reach, and the presence of leadership 
of young people in them, bring to mind the emergence of a new pol-
itical cosmopolitanism among youth. Its native land is the world, and 
its strength lies in its (seeming) absence of structure, its intermittence 
and the multiple nodes in which its utopia is anchored” (Reguillo 
2009: 34). In this analysis Central America’s young generation is both 
“disconnected and unequal” and “well situated, connected, and 
globalized” and increasingly engaged in national and transnational 
youth publics (Reguillo 2009: 23). Other regions provide further evi-
dence of youth agency converging around local networks of publicity 
in Cairo (Arvizu 2009:  387), Tanzania (Tufte and Enghel 2009), and 
Chile (Munoz- Navarro 2009). In Kenya and other parts of the Global 
South, media provide platforms for youth to interact and participate in 
political debates worldwide, leading one analyst to comment that, for 
the Kenyan diaspora, social media is an “integral aspect [of] Kenya’s 
social and political dynamics” (Mukhongo 2014: 325).
However, the implications of these emerging forms of public engage-
ment in regional media cultures require more attention. For example, 
in Central Asia, urban youth are drawing increasingly on global sources 
of information and so “are increasingly judging the worldviews and 
behaviours of parents, teachers, political elites and other traditional 
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authority figures against that global context … they are suddenly able 
to compare themselves with anyone, anywhere” (Ibold 2010:  532). 
As anticipated by Joshua Meyrowitz three decades ago (Meyrowitz 
1985), but now on a global, not national, scale, media flows can work 
to challenge knowledge barriers and destabilize relations between 
generations, so forging new bases for civic identity and action.
13.5.3  Case Study: Connectivity and Social Progress  
in a Chinese Heritage Village
The world’s rural population is at its largest ever today, even though 
the world’s urban population is (slightly) larger. An understanding 
of rural connectivity and its relation to social progress is therefore 
indispensable. Located in the mountainous interior region of China’s 
coastal Zhejiang Province, Heyang has a population of 3,670 and 
more than 1,100  years of history. It is a quintessential embodiment 
of China’s agrarian civilization. Its well- preserved Ming- Qing era trad-
itional architecture earned it a place in 2013 in the Chinese State 
Council’s list of key sites of national cultural relics. However, this is 
also a modernized and globalized village:  with part of its economy 
integrated into global circuits of production and more than half of its 
labor force now working outside the village (most of whom only return 
briefly to reunite with family during festival periods).
Village communications also cut across the traditional and the modern. 
The oral tradition remains strong: the village’s Senior Center and popular 
street corners serve as sites of information and gossip exchange. Public 
announcements are posted at centrally located information boards 
and walls at different village corners. However, the village’s lineage 
book, started more than 600 years ago by a Ming- Dynasty official from 
the village, issued its sixteenth edition in December 2016 with a grand 
ceremony. The book contains biographies of notable individuals and 
registers the names of all male descendants (female descendants were 
first recorded in its fifteenth edition, compiled in 1995).
Wired radio and communal film projection were the most popular 
forms of mediated communication and entertainment during the 
1970s and early 1980s. Along with village assemblies, these low- tech 
forms of communication played pivotal roles in Mao- era political 
mobilization and cultural integration. Their embeddedness in com-
munal life was instrumental to their success in linking villagers to the 
outside world and sustaining village cohesion. Starting, however, from 
the late 1980s, information reception and entertainment have become 
privatized and personalized. As villagers are exposed to wider and 
more diverse media flows, many feel more isolated from each other. 
Social stratification and income polarization, following the dismantling 
of the collective economy, have engendered a further sense of social 
dislocation and community disintegration.
The 1990s saw the village’s further leap into the digital age: automated 
direct dial telephone started in 1990; cable television and analogue 
mobile telephony arrived in 1994 and by 1997, digital mobile tel-
ephony. Today, Heyang is among the 150,000 Chinese villages with 
broadband access (in 2015 China’s State Council promised a 98 per-
cent village broadband access rate by 2020). While desktop computers 
are rare, telephones, especially mobile phones, are widely used, but 
only the young and economically better- off have smartphones to 
connect themselves to the Internet.
In between lies a wide spectrum of communication patterns and 
circuits of connectivity that have made Heyang a small- scale model 
of China’s highly stratified society. Square dancers in the village, for 
example, have used their smartphones to download videos of the 
latest dancing styles, in this way imagining themselves as part of a 
larger national dance community. A  small minority, like their urban 
middle- class counterparts, engage in online stock trade. Wechat, the 
most popular Chinese social media platform, is popular among village 
elites, the young, and the economically well- off. One member of the 
Village Council has more than a dozen Wechat friend circles, with 
relatives, businessmen originally from the village, government officials, 
and students of Heyang’s culture. However, with inclusion also comes 
exclusion: such Wechat friend circles are limited to this member’s own 
professional and interpersonal networks, and so exclude the majority 
of villagers. Moreover, her Wechat communications are mostly exter-
nally directed, aiming at promoting Heyang as a tourist site, rather than 
at fellow villagers. Meanwhile, with the higher cost of a digital cable 
subscription, some poorer villagers have given up on cable television 
service altogether to opt for satellite television, which only requires the 
one- time purchasing cost of a satellite receiving dish. But such satellite 
television services do not include local municipal and county television 
channels. Consequently, these households end up with no access to 
local television news.
As a result, many local residents, especially those in the lower social 
strata, complain about their lack of communication with village leaders, 
lack of effective participation in village affairs, and a general sense of 
powerlessness in shaping the village’s future. Caught in a complex web 
of local governance, land appropriation, village renovation, and tourist 
development, villagers resort to protests and blockages of village con-
struction projects to communicate their demands and frustrations. In 
one case, in an attempt to make their voices heard, some residents 
refused to allow a CCTV crew to film their residential courtyard for 
the 2015 Spring Festival Gala; others have tried to derail the village’s 
lineage book compilation project. A few villagers have also expressed 
a desire for the return of a village wired radio system and Mao- era 
face- to- face meetings of the village community as a whole.
But China’s “great digital leap forward” has not created upwardly 
mobile opportunities for all. X.  Zhu, a 24- year- old Heyang village 
youth, grew up in a well- off family with postsecondary education, but 
did not live to see a future in Heyang. He arranged his own suicide 
through the Internet in early 2010. Another 24- year- old netizen came 
all the way from Yunan Province in southwestern China to commit sui-
cide together with Zhu. Theirs is one of the saddest stories of digital 
connectivity in the Network Age.
13.5.4  Networked Communications Among East Asian 
Precarious Workers
Networked communications offer opportunities in many countries for 
new forms of political and social connection, which may be especially 
important in spreading public knowledge where public broadcasting 
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systems are under threat (see Section 13.4). But this opportunity may 
occur in the context of social conditions, particularly labor markets, 
where ICTs are intensifying the deterioration of working conditions and 
sustaining new structures of precarious labor (SDG 8.8). The resulting 
balance for social progress may therefore be highly ambiguous, and 
Northeast Asia offers an important example of these tensions.
The mobile phone has become deeply entangled with the precarious 
labor culture in Northeast Asia. Mobile communication technology 
has intersected with the emergence of increasingly insecure working 
conditions, particularly those of young Northeast Asian workers, who are 
situated within the “institutionalized precariousness” of a dual economy 
made up of a large reserve army “with no employment prospects, no 
future, [and] no plans” (Bourdieu 1998: 30f.), alongside a small privileged 
minority of secure workers with a regular wage. A “mobile precariat” 
(precarious workers who use mobile phones to sustain their living within 
an always- on- call working culture)24 suffers from chronically insecure 
job positions as temporary staff or contract workers: they are trapped 
at the bottom of the pay scale, yet at the same time remain connected 
through media to the workplace (Qiu 2009). This mobile precariat is 
disadvantaged not only through the labor exploitation they endure, but 
also when it comes to seeking remedies for these injustices (see Seo and 
Kim 2009; Shaviro 2002 for important studies).
Employers’ attitudes vary to mobile phone use among their precarious 
workers. Whereas in Japan and Taiwan, workers must leave their phones 
behind, beyond their reach, when they start work, in South Korea, where 
the conditions for workers are extremely insecure with the second 
longest working hours among OECD countries (2,124 hours/ year as of 
2014),25 mobile phones are allowed at work. However, in all countries, 
possessing a mobile phone renders precarious workers vulnerable to a 
wider culture of surveillance. Many employers monitor their workers’ 
lives outside of formal working hours by using mobile instant messa-
ging services (KakaoTalk in Korea; WeChat in China; Line in Japan and 
Taiwan). Transgressing the normal boundaries of work, employers use 
phones to issue orders to their precarious workers on matters such as 
cleanliness, service management, and the employee code of conduct.
The outcomes are, however, unstable. In South Korea, young precar-
ious workers have attempted to stir public opinion against unjust 
business practices, by posting images and chat messages on social 
media platforms. They, in turn, have been disciplined through remote 
monitoring on live surveillance mobile apps and mobile instant messa-
ging. In Japan, there have been on- and offline protests against “black 
companies,” notorious for exploiting precarious workers, with workers 
using the Internet and social media to disclose their unfair treatment in 
the workplace and share it with others. Given the collapse of the public 
broadcasting system in Japan, online citizen journalism and alterna-
tive journalism have also offered platforms for building alternative 
understandings of social justice in the workplace that go beyond the 
agendas of mainstream media.
In summary, Northeast Asia offers a clear example of how the mobile 
phone as an infrastructure of connection has become a new technique 
for regulating labor in an always- on- call culture, yet continues to offer 
opportunities for movements for social justice and social progress.
13.6  Struggles for Social Justice Through the 
Democratization of Media
Having in Sections 13.4 and 13.5 considered how the outputs of media 
contribute variously to new forms of social connection and environ-
ments of public knowledge  – two preconditions for action towards 
social progress – we turn in this section to the new social issues raised 
by the increasingly complex governance structures for media and 
communications outlined in Section 13.3. We first place those issues 
within the context of a longer- term struggle for media reform.
13.6.1  The Longer History of Democratizing Media
The expansion of media infrastructures into ever wider areas of life 
through digital platforms has generated new types of media activism 
(Milan 2016). Across the Global South and the Global North, today’s 
media activists fight struggles on diverse fronts. However, popular 
attempts to shape media infrastructures into more democratic and 
inclusive social institutions did not begin with the media activists of 
the twenty- first century.
Just as media infrastructures have developed differently in each nation 
and region of the world (see Section 13.2), so efforts to reshape and 
reform the media are varied. Before the consolidation of the adver-
tising- supported commercial press, radical working- class publications 
in the United Kingdom, United States, and Canada emerged to challenge 
the dominant press order (Hackett and Zhao 1998). With the rise of 
electronic communication, US media activists in the 1920s and 1930s 
demanded public ownership of the telegraph and noncommercial radio 
(McChesney 1993; Stein 2009). In Russia and China, communist and 
nationalist revolutionaries established alternative media systems as 
part of their attempts to seek social progress through anticapitalistic 
and nationalistic struggles; the resulting media structures, however, 
degenerated into ossified state- controlled systems. Nevertheless, anti-
establishment communication forms (underground tabloids and sam-
izdat in Russia; the big- character posters on China’s Democracy Wall) 
testified to the radical democratic communication impulse of these 
post- revolutionary societies.
In the 1960s and 1970s, civil rights movements in the United States 
and Canada responded to poor media coverage of their struggles for 
social justice by demanding more access to the mainstream media, and 
developing their own media (Stein 2009). The battle around cable tele-
vision regulation in these countries was one of the most salient victories 
of media reform movements, as cable companies are now mandated to 
establish community and educational channels free of charge (Halleck 
2001) (SPI “Access to basic knowledge”). In Latin America, in response 
to the brutal dictatorships of the 1970s and 1980s, grassroots groups 
developed their own underground communication networks in a long 
24 Also known as Alba [알바] in South Korea, [xin gong ren 新工人] in China, and Freeter [furita フリーター] in Japan.
25 OECD.StatExtract, 2016.
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battle to pressure states to democratize the media (Rodríguez and 
Murphy 1997). Meanwhile, in several European countries, pirate radio 
was the precursor of later struggles for media regulation that guaran-
tees space for public and community media (Jankowski, Prehn, and 
Stappers 1992).
In 1976, in one of the earliest global efforts to democratize the media, 
Amadou Mathar M’Bow, Director of UNESCO, appointed a commission 
of 16 experts to examine global communication problems. The 
commission’s final report, known as the MacBride Report, described 
shocking information inequalities between First and Third World coun-
tries (UNESCO 1980). The report documented high levels of media 
concentration in a few transnational media corporations mostly 
located in rich, industrialized countries. Such concentration had many 
damaging consequences including highly unequal information flows 
between rich and poor countries; a lack of diversity among the voices 
and sources of information and communication; and a flow of media 
content from the North to the South that threatened the latter’s local 
cultures. The MacBride Report argued that a New World Information 
and Communication Order was urgently necessary.
Efforts towards a NWICO, including recommendations for national 
communication policies, reduced media concentration, more South- 
to- South communication channels, and a mass media code of ethics, 
embroiled UNESCO in a high- profile dispute with the United States, 
who interpreted the report’s recommendations as a threat to “freedom 
of the press,” defined within the liberal framework as freedom from 
government control. In 2003, the Communication Rights for the 
Information Society Campaign (CRIS) emerged as a new moment 
of global media reform. The CRIS Campaign, which still continues, 
encompasses four pillars of communication rights: the right to partici-
pate in the public sphere; the right to knowledge; civil rights in com-
munication; and cultural rights in communication (Siochrú 2005).
The first two decades of the twenty- first century have been marked 
by UNESCO‘s efforts to protect journalists and defend freedom of 
expression. The UN Human Rights Council’s “Resolution on the 
Safety of Journalists” (2016) is welcome, but does not yet extend to 
Russia and China. In 2015, Member States endorsed the concept of 
“internet universality” which includes four principles for internet gov-
ernance:  human rights, openness, accessibility, and multistakeholder 
participation (UNESCO 2015).
Looking back over the past four decades, international governmental 
organizations and media activists have broadened their platforms 
and struggles to include communications as an important dimen-
sion of social progress. As Laura Stein notes: “communication policy 
activism spans the gamut from representational concerns with the end 
products of communication to the deep- seated political, economic, 
regulatory, and infrastructural issues that shape the larger cultural 
environment” (Stein 2009: 2– 3). At stake in this continued battle is a 
foundational change in the governance of media and communications 
infrastructures no less profound than that called for urban governance 
in Chapter 5. We turn for the rest of this section to specific struggles 
that target the underlying communications infrastructure of the digital 
age and its increasingly complex needs for governance.
13.6.2  Transparency and Accountability of Media 
Infrastructures and Mediated Data Flows
The last decade has seen the emergence of increasing global concern 
about the transparency and accountability of media infrastructures 
and the data flows that they carry (SDG 9; SPI “Access to informa-
tion and communications”). In some cases, those concerns have 
prompted popular protests and engendered new forms and sites of 
resistance. One important category of concern about transparency and 
accountability relates to the conditions of access to information online. 
Populations worldwide have begun to pay attention to the effects of 
private agreements for preferential treatment that, behind the scenes, 
structure the universe of information they see (IPSP 2017).
Initially, struggles over preferential treatment took the form of efforts 
to secure formal enactment of the principle of “network neutrality.” 
Proponents of network neutrality argued that internet access providers 
should treat all content, sites, and services equally without discrimin-
ating among different sources, services, or providers, while internet 
access providers sought greater leeway to experiment with differential 
quality of service. For the most part, countries around the world have 
resolved this debate in favor of network neutrality, although European 
regulations create a preferential exemption for certain specialized, 
high- bandwidth services.26 Since there is no reason to believe that 
unregulated markets by themselves will preserve anything like net-
work neutrality, this issue is likely to remain important for media’s 
positive contribution to public knowledge.
Formal regulatory adoption of network neutrality mandates, however, 
has not resolved disputes about preferential access, but has simply 
shifted the terrain. Worldwide, regulatory implementation of network 
non- discrimination mandates has often been followed by so- called 
“zero- rating” initiatives. Zero- rating refers to an arrangement by 
which an internet access provider or mobile services provider agrees 
to exempt a particular content service from the data caps otherwise 
imposed on its users. Such agreements may be made in return for flat 
payments or in return for access to data about the behavior of users as 
they use the zero- rated service. Zero- rating agreements tend to drive 
traffic toward exempted data services, to the advantage of those pro-
viding them, so indirectly challenging the net neutrality principle.
A second important category of transparency and accountability issues 
relates to targeted removal of online information. Such removal may 
be mandated or initiated by an information intermediary (for example, 
a platform company). It may also involve the threatened (or feared) 
assertion of intellectual property rights, a request for removal, or 
26 For the US regulation, see “Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet,” 80 Fed. Reg. 19,737 (April 13, 2015). For the European Union regulation, see Regulation 2015/ 2120 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 laying down measures concerning open internet access and amending Directive 2002/ 22/ EC on universal 
service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services and Regulation (EU) No 531/ 2012 on roaming on public mobile communications networks 
within the Union, L 301/ 1.
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de- indexing in connection with rights afforded under data protection 
regulation, enforcement of privately defined acceptable- content pol-
icies, or direct state censorship. Because the failure to remove some 
types of information can itself raise justice issues, targeted removal 
may sometimes be appropriate. Very often, however, such content 
filtering mechanisms remain secretive and unaccountable. Concerns 
about secret and unaccountable content filtering have sparked 
protests around the world, resulting in a new model of activism that 
takes digital media simultaneously as a site and target of protest 
activity. Such activity has achieved political gains, but arguably also 
accelerated the shift toward corporatized governance (described in 
Section 13.3.2).
In the United States, a protest movement that originated domestic-
ally and then spread globally defeated proposed legislation that tried 
to impose content filtering obligations on domain name registrars and 
payment providers (Herman 2013). Subsequently, however, major US 
payment providers have acceded to a set of voluntary “best practices” 
that involves them more actively in private intellectual property enforce-
ment (Bridy 2015). In Australia, a popular protest movement opposed 
a government proposal that would have required internet service 
providers to perform mandatory content filtering; the government even-
tually withdrew the proposal after political opposition proved firm, and 
after the major Australian ISPs voluntarily agreed to block 1,400 sites 
previously identified as child pornography purveyors.27 In China, where 
state involvement in filtering and suppression of dissident or otherwise 
disfavored expression is more direct, protest movements have taken 
correspondingly more indirect forms that involve the use of seemingly 
innocuous code words to discuss forbidden topics (Link and Xiao 2013).
Anticensorship and “internet freedom” activists have developed new, 
crowd- sourced methods of discovering and documenting content 
removal efforts and actions, producing websites such as chillingeffects.
org, a US- based site that catalogues copyright takedown notices, and 
onlinecensorship.org, a project by the Electronic Frontier Foundation 
that catalogues content removals by social media sites. Some global 
platform companies, such as Twitter and Google, have begun to dis-
seminate information about various types of targeted removals (e.g. 
Google’s “transparency report”), although they have been much less 
forthcoming about their own acceptable- content protocols.
A final set of concerns about transparency and accountability relates 
to processes of automated, algorithmically processed mediation and 
filtering. Many dominant market providers  – Google and Baidu in 
search, Facebook in social networking, Twitter in microblogging – use 
predictive algorithms to structure the universe of information that 
users see, and network neutrality mandates do not address those 
practices. Such algorithms operate invisibly to create displays to users 
that are tailored to what is known or inferred about that user. To indi-
vidual users, however, the displays may appear universal and neutral. 
As we noted in Section 13.3, there are important, unresolved issues 
concerning the accountability of such automated filtering.
13.6.3  New Concentrations of Power Via Media 
Infrastructures and Mediated Data Flows
The new concentrations of power exerted via media infrastructures 
and mediated data flows have themselves generated rising levels of 
concern, prompting activism by civil society groups and sometimes 
more widespread protests and struggles (SDG 9).
One important cluster of issues involves proprietary claims to infor-
mation networks and resources. Even as digital media activists and 
civil society groups have pushed for greater legal freedom to store, 
share, and modify content online, law enforcement authorities around 
the world have pushed to make outlaws of individuals and businesses 
who facilitate file- sharing. Enforcement has proceeded both via 
highly publicized litigation and by off- the- record efforts to seize or 
block access to internet domains (McCourt and Burkart 2003; Palmer 
and Warren 2013; see also Bridy 2015). In addition, as discussed in 
Section  13.3.2, both nation- states and powerful corporate actors 
have sought enhanced intellectual property protection through trade 
agreements. In Europe, popular opposition to the prospect of stepped- 
up intellectual property enforcement defeated ratification of the Anti- 
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, which had been negotiated with the 
United States, Japan, and other countries. However, many provisions 
for enhanced enforcement have appeared in a different agreement, 
the Trans- Pacific Partnership (which was signed in 2016 but has not 
entered into force) (Public Citizen 2015b). Less is known about another 
agreement, the Trans- Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, now 
under negotiation between the United States and Europe.
Another set of issues relating to power exerted through today’s fast- 
changing media infrastructures involves the surveillance conducted 
by powerful third parties, such as nation- states (IPSP 2017). In the 
wake of the revelations by Edward Snowden about the extent of the 
US National Security Administration’s surveillance of global electronic 
communications, both ordinary citizens and governments worldwide 
protested NSA’s lawless and seemingly unconstrained behavior. The 
Snowden revelations, however, also showed that national security ser-
vices in multiple jurisdictions – including some of those now protesting 
most loudly – cooperated with the NSA and with each other, helping to 
form a network for evading existing domestic procedures for oversight 
(Privacy International 2013).28
Resistance to those efforts has taken varied forms. Some experts in 
computer security have formed ventures to develop and market secure 
“black phones” and online tools, while others have helped activists 
and civil society groups to explore, understand, and expose the full 
range of lawful and unlawful government surveillance activity.29 As 
described in Section 13.3, some large information companies also 
have actively resisted the expansion of government surveillance. One 
country, Iceland, has resolved to develop comprehensive legislation 
establishing itself as a safe harbor for whistleblowers and investiga-
tive journalists.30
27 See Ramadge (2008) and Charette (2012).
28 See MacAskill and Ball (2013).
29 See Laskow (2014), Rinehart (2015), Schneier, Seidel, and Vijayakumar (2016).
30 International Modern Media Institute, “IMMI Resolution.” https:// en.immi.is/ immi- resolution/ .
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Civil society organizations and, more recently, frustrated legislators, 
have put sustained pressure on trade negotiators to make treaty 
processes more transparent and democratically accountable.31 New 
political movements and parties have formed around platforms for 
access to information and free culture (Beyer 2014), and the free/ libre/ 
open source software (FLOSS) movement has worked to foster the 
development and adoption of open systems that may be freely used 
and adapted (Coleman 2013; Gamalielsson and Lundell 2014).
A third cluster of struggles involves efforts by privacy activists and 
researchers to mobilize civil society groups and the public against 
commercial information power. This struggle needs to be understood 
within a wider diagnosis of contemporary media infrastructures’ cen-
tral role in the emergence of a new form of surveillance capitalism, 
whereby populations worldwide comprise a source of raw materials 
for new practices of surplus extraction (Cohen 2015; Zuboff 2015).
Disputes over these questions are as widely varied as the contexts and 
population groups involved. In the United States and Europe, com-
mercial surveillance practices have engendered legal struggles over 
behavioral credit monitoring, drawing attention to the role of pre-
dictive profiling in the high- risk lending practices that contributed to 
the global financial crisis of 2008 (Pasquale 2015). Meanwhile, in an 
effort to enlist users themselves in both frustrating and exposing the 
practices of surveillance capitalism, teams of researchers have worked 
to design new privacy tools, such as ad blockers and tracker visualiza-
tion tools (Eaglehardt and Narayanan 2016; Kennedy 2016).
In the Global South, struggles over the spread of surveillance capitalism 
have involved challenges to public– private partnerships for the delivery 
of services. In India, debates concerning the possible uses of a new 
national identification number have proved sharply divisive. In 2015, the 
Indian government launched the Digital India Initiative, which is based 
on the use of the Aadhar Unique Identity (UID) scheme for biometric 
authentication of recipients of government benefits and services. The 
Aadhar scheme, which is the world’s largest biometrics- based database 
initiative, was developed by corporate technology partners, and critics 
charge that too little is known about its capabilities and potential future 
uses (see also the India case study in Section 13.6.4).32 In sub- Saharan 
Africa, questions have been raised about the undisclosed uses of data 
collected via privately funded mobile telephony and banking initiatives 
(Hosein and Nyst 2013; Taylor 2016a; Taylor and Broeders 2015).
More generally, in the international development context, attention to 
data protection questions has highlighted how routine practices of data 
collection and sharing can put local populations at risk (Taylor 2016b) 
(SPI “Private rights”). There is a deep, if rarely noticed, continuity 
between these recent debates about control of networked information 
flows and the struggles of indigenous peoples against broadcasters for 
many decades. For example, Australia’s Aboriginal communities have 
developed protocols that regulate how media makers – both individual 
media producers and media industries  – can proceed on Aboriginal 
lands and among Aboriginal communities (Janke 1999; West 2014). 
Any individual producer or media industry intending to operate 
among Aboriginal communities must gain clearances from Aboriginal 
custodians before capturing, disseminating, reproducing, or archiving 
data about the land or the people. By defining a framework of respect, 
integrity, authenticity, and consultation with Aboriginal authorities and 
custodians, Aboriginal protocols have sought to ensure media account-
ability. Far from seeing such protocols as part of a “local culture” that 
unhelpfully resists “progress” (compare IPSP Chapter  15), we need 
to look to them as precursors of the fundamental changes needed in 
the governance of data flows. But no such protocols have yet been 
developed to govern data flows in the wider development context.
13.6.4  Case Study: Civil Society Activism in 
India: Facebook Free Basics33
Recent events in India offer an example of the ability of civil society 
activism to challenge the power of global digital platforms. We will 
focus here particularly on Facebook’s proposed introduction of its 
“Free Basics” platform for internet access, but will situate the struggle 
over Free Basics in the broader context of other disputes over informa-
tion rights in India in recent years.
Facebook’s Free Basics platform is a joint private– public partnership 
ostensibly committed to expanding internet access for first- time users 
of the Internet in select countries in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. 
Facebook’s CEO, Mark Zuckerberg, launched the initiative in 2013 (ori-
ginally branded as Internet.org) in partnership with Samsung, Ericsson, 
MediaTek, Opera Software, Nokia, and Qualcomm. It was based on an 
“app” that enables smartphone users limited, free access to certain 
sites and services on the Internet, and that is designed to function on 
less robust 2G networks, potentially encouraging users to subscribe to 
mobile access packages (Hemple 2016).
From the Indian government’s perspective, Free Basics represented an 
opportunity to expand its digital footprint into the daily lives of Indian 
citizens, by integrating Free Basics within its flagship Digital India ini-
tiative (discussed in Section 13.6.2). The Indian PM Narendra Modi’s 
attempts to use social media including Twitter, Facebook, Youtube, 
Instagram, and other platforms for political purposes are well known 
(Pal, Chandra, and Vydiswaran 2016). In September 2015, he met Mark 
Zuckerberg in Silicon Valley, California (Mukherjee 2015). For Facebook, 
signing India to Free Basics would have given Facebook unrivalled 
access to the members of its second largest market (125 million users). 
The deal was celebrated on Facebook with both Modi’s and Zuckerberg’s 
profile pictures wrapped in the green, orange, and white of the Indian 
flag, leading millions of users to update their profiles with the tri- color.
Civil society activists, however, viewed Free Basics as an attempt by 
a commercial vendor to tether users to its product and monopolize 
the terms of access to the wider Internet, so compromising the tenets 
31 Perhaps as a result, some provisions of the Trans- Pacific Partnership’s intellectual property chapter are less draconian than they had been in earlier, leaked versions of the 
proposed text. See Cox (2015).
32 See Dreze (2015), Kakkar (2010), Masiero (2014), Punj (2012). See also Section 13.6.3.
33 Case study written by Pradip Thomas.
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of network neutrality (discussed in Section 13.6.2). While civil society 
groups in India had previously advocated specific reforms such as 
banning software patents and support for free and open source soft-
ware (FOSS), a new “Save the Internet” campaign mobilized millions 
of users to petition the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) to 
uphold the broad principle of network neutrality. Facebook was com-
pletely caught off guard by the extent of the mobilization of Indian civil 
society in India against Free Basics.
In February 2016, the TRAI acted to uphold the principle of network 
neutrality. TRAI’s regulation, titled “Prohibition of Discriminatory 
Tariffs for Data Services Regulation” provides that “no service pro-
vider shall offer or charge discriminatory tariffs for data services on 
the basis of content.” TRAI’s response was surprising given its pre-
vious support for industry interests over those of civil society (Abraham 
2016). Additionally, while trade bodies such as the Cellular Operators 
Association of India (COAI) supported “differential pricing,” others 
such as the National Association for Software and Services Companies 
(NASSCOM) opposed it.
This episode, which illustrates both the potential for cozy, mutually 
beneficial relationships between global platform companies and 
nation- state governments and the ability of civil society to challenge 
such relationships, needs to be put in the broader context of grassroots 
struggle for information rights in India in recent years (SPI “Access to 
information and communications”). Campaigns spearheaded by indi-
viduals such as Aruna Roy and Nikhil Dey and organizations such as 
the National Campaign for People’s Right to Information led to the 
Indian government enacting the Right to Information Act in 2005. Such 
campaigns, along with a variety of social movements for information 
rights, created a broader recognition of the need for knowledge of 
entitlements and rights, facilitated access to information, and trans-
parency and accountability in the disbursement of public funds.
This broad Right to Information movement laid the foundations for the 
subsequent struggles not only against Facebook‘s Free Basics initiative 
but also against the Aadhar Unique Identity (UID) scheme (discussed 
in Section  13.6.3). A  number of the organizations that contested 
Free Basics also contest the Aadhar initiative. They have consistently 
highlighted shortfalls in the collection of biometric data, the security, 
and authentication issues that surround a centralized database on 
citizens, the potential for misuse of private information and for mass 
surveillance of citizens, and the absence of privacy laws. While the gov-
ernment has defended the scheme as a means to combat benefit fraud 
and protect national security, critics highlighted successfully the threat 
to basic freedoms from this expansion of the digital infrastructure. 
13.6.5  Normative Implications of Media Infrastructures 
and Mediated Data Flows
The developments discussed in this section raise three broad sets of 
normative implications: for autonomy, economic justice, and political 
self- determination.
First and most basically, new and unaccountable concentrations of 
power exerted via media infrastructures and mediated data flows 
have implications for individual autonomy. As media infrastructures 
become more pervasive in everyday life, they increasingly mediate 
the human experience of the self, the other, and the world. As they 
connect individuals and communities, they also structure the universe 
of information and personalize informational exposure. The dynamics 
of continual, feedback- driven personalization invest information 
intermediaries with enormous power over processes of individual 
self- determination, which in a less intensively mediated world have 
been much more open textured and amenable to serendipity (Cohen 
2012). Since individual autonomy is a necessary element of any form 
of social progress, it is essential to consider the implications of such 
large- scale media- based developments for the ongoing goal of social 
progress.
Second, as described in Section  13.3.3, the emergence of new eco-
nomic models based on surveillance, social sorting, and predictive 
profiling has implications for economic justice (SDG 9). The neces-
sary frameworks for protective regulation against such forms of data 
extraction are incompletely developed and unevenly implemented. 
Moreover, as privacy activists and civil society organizations world-
wide have worked to raise public awareness of surveillance and its 
threats to privacy, they have struggled against an antiregulatory dis-
course that aims to defeat protective regulation by linking surveillance 
tightly with a generalized innovation imperative (Cohen 2016).
Finally, commercial and government practices of surveillance, social 
sorting, and predictive profiling have profound implications for pol-
itical self- determination. The basic possibilities for political self- 
determination are important not just for political processes themselves, 
but also for wider processes of human development, richly understood 
(Sen 1999). Yet there is mounting evidence that predictive algorithms 
can be used to alter user behavior, in ways that implicate values of 
democratic self- governance and the rule of law. Facebook has publicly 
acknowledged conducting experiments on how personalization of the 
content in newsfeeds can affect users’ moods and other experiments 
reminding users to go to the polls and vote (Grimmelmann 2015). 
There is no guarantee that future experiments would be disclosed, nor 
is Facebook subject to ethical guidelines similar to those that constrain 
human- subject experimentation in other contexts. Google’s chief 
economist similarly has characterized Google’s user base as subjects 
for experimentation (Varian 2014).
The prospect that large information intermediaries may enjoy wholly 
unaccountable power to manipulate the flows of social and public 
knowledge is alarming. More generally, the continuous, immanent, 
and highly granular regulatory processes by which such privately con-
trolled intermediaries exert power via media infrastructures (and the 
new discourse of human development through the exploitation of 
“big data” that helps legitimate such power) exist in tension with 
broadly shared commitments to due process and the rule of law 
(Hildebrandt 2015).
We end this section with an important case where the broad social 
justice issues raised by the governance of media and communications 
infrastructures entered the political domain:  the civil- society based 
NETmundial initiative that emerged in Brazil in the wake of the 
Snowden revelations.
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34 Case study written by Omar Rincón.
35 Compare the similar “right to free development of [the] personality” recognized in German law: Article 2 of the Grundgesetz.
13.6.6  Case Study: Brazil’s Marco Civil on Internet 
Governance34
After the Snowden scandal of 2013 revealed mass electronic sur-
veillance and espionage by US intelligence agencies, diverse global 
initiatives to defend the freedom of the Internet emerged from civil 
society. At the time of writing, the most progressive regulatory frame-
work for the Internet is Marco Civil da Internet (Civil Rights Framework 
for the Internet), an initiative developed jointly by Brazil’s civil society 
and the former government of Dilma Rousseff. Unlike authoritarian 
states who show greater concern over the implications of the Internet 
for regime stability than for freedom, and unlike liberal democra-
cies in North America and Europe  – who fear increased state con-
trol and often defer to private, corporatized governance of media 
infrastructures  – Brazil supports universal free internet, while being 
also critical of the international governance structures that guide it 
(Trinkunas and Wallace 2015:  2). The Marco Civil is an exemplar of 
alternative ways of thinking about internet governance and its rela-
tion to wider social justice, without claiming that, by itself, a regula-
tory framework can create a different type of internet infrastructure, 
let alone address all the issues of power to which any communications 
infrastructure gives rise.
The Marco Civil sought to rethink what freedom and citizenship 
mean when it comes to the Internet. Adopted on April 23, 2014, the 
Civil Rights Framework is intended as a prototype for Internet regu-
lation globally. The Marco Civil emerged from NETmundial, a confer-
ence convened by Brazil’s national internet steering committee and 
organized as a multi- stakeholder dialogue between government, 
industry, and civil society. The framework that became the Marco Civil 
was developed through a series of online and offline deliberations that 
invited Brazilian citizens to shape a legal framework for internet regu-
lation. It is significant not only as an initiative born from civil society 
in dialogue with government and private sectors, but also as a pro-
posal emerging from the Global South, framed by social movements 
committed to the idea of communication rights. The Marco Civil has 
the potential to act as a balance to the global power of the United 
States on internet governance issues.
The Brazilian Civil Rights Framework for the Internet advances the 
commitment to respect for civil rights as an important component of 
internet regulation and governance. Recognizing the vulnerability of 
users, the Marco Civil emphasizes the Internet’s social goals, protects 
the rights of internet users, and proposes the adoption of open source 
technologies that allow free access to information, knowledge, and 
culture. In the eyes of civil society activists (Gutiérrez 2014), the most 
important achievements of Brazil’s Marco Civil include protection of 
freedom and privacy, open governance, universal inclusion, cultural 
diversity, and network neutrality.
The Marco Civil considers access to the Internet fundamental to 
democracy, as it is essential for participation in political life and cul-
tural production, and part of the right to education and freedom of 
expression. It therefore advocates reducing inequalities in access to 
digital technologies and promotes the development of competencies 
to use digital platforms effectively. It proposes universal internet ser-
vice with controlled rates and sufficient connection speed and also 
promotes education on the rights of consumers, ethical consumerism, 
and protection against misleading advertising and deceptive business 
methods (Compare SPI “Access to basic knowledge”).
The Marco Civil stipulates that, while internet providers are free to 
compete, they are also responsible for guaranteeing freedom of 
speech, freedom of access to information, net neutrality, and protec-
tion of privacy. The Marco Civil forbids any type of discrimination based 
on disability, sexual orientation, or political or religious affiliations. It 
also provides for the protection of users’ data and reputation and the 
right to the free development of personality,35 and guarantees the 
right to access information and the right to rectification (SPI “Access 
to information and communications”). The Marco Civil states that citi-
zens should be encouraged to move from being mere consumers of 
information, knowledge, and culture to becoming content creators. The 
framework calls for the development of appropriate digital tools to 
facilitate the creation of information, knowledge, and culture by citi-
zens and states that the Internet should promote the production and 
circulation of such local content. Not surprisingly therefore movements 
that defend the freedom of knowledge strongly support this new code, 
to which Brazil’s free software community was a principal contributor 
(Gutiérrez 2014). As initially proposed, the Marco Civil also mandated 
that all information and content about Brazil should be archived in 
Brazil, but that restriction was removed following lobbying by trans-
national internet corporations. Ultimately, the Marco Civil provided 
that all Brazilian internet content or content about Brazil is considered 
“Brazilian” and can be the object of observation. The Marco Civil 
eliminates criminal copyright penalties for content usage by citizens. 
However, it recognizes civil copyright laws that limit access to digital 
content and hinder collaborative creation, in tension with the goal of 
an entirely free digital culture.
The Brazilian Civil Rights Framework for the Internet mandates net-
work neutrality (discussed in Section  13.6.2), and prohibits discrim-
inatory action against any type of content or user, either by changing 
the speed of transmission or restricting content. Network neutrality 
ensures that all data travels at the same speed and without any 
restrictions based on the nature of the content or the nature of the 
user. Brazil’s Marco Civil forbids blocking, monitoring, filtering, or ana-
lyzing content for commercial, political, moral, religious, or ideological 
reasons. The principle of network neutrality is here affirmed as essen-
tial to a collaborative and democratic digital culture.
The Brazilian Civil Rights Framework proposes a model of governance 
through multi- stakeholder, transparent, collaborative, and democratic 
mechanisms. The creators of the Marco Civil hoped to inspire activists 
and civil society organizations in other countries to demand similar 
laws (Gutierrez 2014), proposing “a global Internet that promotes 
freedom, inclusion, and diversity” (Trinkunas and Wallace 2015: 37). 
The code’s provisions were in many cases opposed by global platform 
companies and sometimes defeated. It remains too early to determine 
the long- term influence of the model proposed, but its significance as 
an alternative to standard models of governance remains.
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13.7  Struggles for Social Justice Through Media
We come in this final main section of the chapter to consider the dis-
tinctive role that media and communications play in struggles for 
social justice and those struggles’ overall contribution to social pro-
gress. The transformation of media infrastructures in the final decades 
of the twentieth century gave rise to new communication ecologies, 
which enabled divergent worldviews and political interests to draw 
on a multitude of media resources in their struggles for social justice.
13.7.1  Appropriating the Digital
Individuals and communities around the world have learned to appro-
priate media, especially digital communications infrastructures. The 
most notable late twentieth- century case of appropriating media for 
social justice was provided by the Zapatistas in Mexico.
In 1994, just as Mexico was preparing to sign the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the United States and Canada, 
the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) (Zapatista Army 
of National Liberation), an indigenous guerrilla organization, abruptly 
came to national attention by seizing towns in the region of Chiapas 
and demanding land, work, food, housing, education, independence, 
freedom, justice, and peace for Mexico’s indigenous communities. The 
Mexican government attempted to annihilate the EZLN before news of 
the group reached the global public sphere but did not succeed. The 
EZLN’s resistance has been analyzed from many perspectives, but in 
this chapter its importance lies not in its general repertoire of activism, 
but more as an exemplar of how, in the late twentieth century, media 
and culture came to be appropriated in new ways by social justice 
movements.
Using diverse media technologies and strategies, the Zapatistas 
activated a communication network that linked Mexican indigenous 
communities with social justice activists worldwide. In terms of media 
technology, Zapatista videos recorded on VHS tapes were carried out 
of the Lacandon jungle to the nearest urban centers and then on to 
Mexico City, where US activists picked them up and took them to 
Austin, Texas to be digitized and uploaded on computer listservs; 
meanwhile Zapatista audio recordings and texts were translated 
into multiple languages and disseminated via then- emerging digital 
platforms. In terms of cultural message, Subcomandante Marcos, the 
main spokesperson of the Zapatistas at the time, used these prac-
tical means to issue statements that framed the local struggles of 
marginalized Mexican indigenous communities as aligned with other 
social justice and identity struggles in the Global North and Global 
South (Rodríguez, Kidd, and Stein 2010), proposing himself as standing 
in for “every untolerated, oppressed, exploited minority that is … now 
beginning to speak” (Subcomandante Marcos 1994).
Through their distinctive use of communications (both technological 
and cultural) the Zapatistas served to link social justice collectives and 
individuals worldwide into a wave of international solidarity in the 
global public sphere, alerting the Mexican government and its army 
that the whole world was monitoring human rights abuses against indi-
genous communities in southern Mexico (Pianta and Marchetti 2007). 
Social justice activists in many countries worldwide came to adopt 
Zapatista language, goals, and communication strategies. “Zapatismo” 
came for many to represent a new type of social justice activism, based 
less on formal institutional structures and more on “participation and 
deliberation, collective autonomy, and decentralized power structures” 
(Ferron 2012: 157). Marcos’ specific manifesto for the “construction 
of a world where many worlds fit” (EZLN 1996) became exemplary 
for linking social justice to questions of culture (voice and diversity in 
public spheres) and questions of media (the need for inclusive media 
infrastructures).
The influence of this exemplar was shown in December 1999 by the 
actions of a wide coalition of protesters who met in Seattle to disrupt a 
World Trade Organization (WTO) summit. Because the Seattle protests 
originated a series of demonstrations against the dominant model of 
neoliberal globalization, the movement is sometimes labelled the “anti- 
globalization movement,” but they refused that label, as they were not 
opposed to globalization, but to specific economic models that spread 
inequity worldwide. Learning from the EZLN, this movement insisted on 
producing their own media rather than allowing mainstream media to 
shape the narrative about their actions. The Seattle protest organizers 
set up the first Independent Media Center (Indymedia), and enabled 
protesters to produce and edit their own coverage of the protests 
by uploading to Indymedia’s web page, which, in turn, incorporated 
Open Publishing software made available by media activist Matthew 
Arnison from Sydney’s Community Activist Technology group (Arnison 
2001; Kidd 2004). This model was replicated during the first decade 
of the twenty- first century in hundreds of cities worldwide under the 
motto “Don’t hate the media, be the media.”
Even in a world of corporate- owned digital platforms, these visions 
from the Lacandon jungle and Seattle still resonate through alternative 
models of how social justice activists can appropriate and redesign 
media technologies to meet their distinctive information and commu-
nication needs (Rodríguez 2001, in press).
13.7.2  Affordances and Constraints: From the Mobile 
Phone to Social Media and Beyond
If the circumstances of the Zapatistas’ innovations were exceptional, 
broader changes in access to media technologies have been important 
too. With the introduction of prepaid accounts, low- cost handsets and 
relatively easy connectivity, mobile phone usage has spread across all 
social groups, including poor and marginalized populations. Despite 
stark inequalities in access, use, literacy, and resources (Donner 2015; 
Qiu 2014), much social innovation and activism with mobile phones 
has emerged, enabling collective action of all sorts, whether pro-
gressive or not. At the same time, the migration of activism to new 
digital platforms has encountered new constraints. We must always 
remember that the very same communication resources that benefit 
movements for social justice and social progress are also benefiting 
the movements that oppose them, including forces of right- wing 
extremism and authoritarian populism. Before discussing activism in 
more detail, it is important to note also that the affordances of mobile 
technologies and social networking platforms enable new kinds of 
everyday solidarity in contexts outside of politics. The use of mobile 
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phones, the Internet, and social media has been important among 
migrants and their dispersed family, cultural, and political networks 
(Fortunati, Pertierra, and Vincent 2012). Filipino workers and other 
domestic workers (generally women) who spend years away from 
their families and communities use mobile phones and social media to 
maintain bonds and connection with friends and families (Madianou 
and Miller 2012). Chinese migrants who leave rural areas to find work 
in cities (Chu et al. 2012) also rely on mobile phones to create a new 
“modern” identity, spanning urban and rural settings (Wallis 2013). 
Outside the context of migration, diverse communities use mobile 
phones to redraw the boundaries between the private and personal 
and create “intimate publics” (Hjorth, King, and Kataoka 2014), for 
example to mourn or grieve (Cann 2014; Cuminsky and Hjorth 2016). 
In the wake of the earthquake and tsunami disaster of March 11, 2011 
social media and mobile phones provided new channels for citizens to 
witness solidarity and contribute to disaster responses in Japan (Hjorth 
and Kim 2011).
One of the earliest places where uses of social media and mobile 
phones entered politics was Africa, where mobiles have been used 
for sharing information on health (SDG 3), “witnessing” human rights 
violations (through the incorporation of cameras into mobile phones), 
and citizen journalism, including election monitoring (Ekine 2010). 
An instructive case is Ushahidi (meaning “testimony” in Swahili), a 
mobile- based platform developed to share information and create 
maps to report on postelection violence in Kenya in 2008. In the South 
African elections of 2009, political groups and their supporters used 
different kinds of mobile software, combining instant messaging and 
chat functions to enhance communication (SDG 10). Labor struggles in 
Africa have also adopted the Internet and especially the mobile phone, 
alongside traditional media, for purposes of mobilization, coordination, 
and solidarity, for example the Marikana mine workers in South Africa 
(Walton 2014) and the El- Mahalla textile workers in Egypt. Section 
13.5.4 discussed parallel developments in Northeast Asia.
Another important affordance of ICTs for social justice struggles is 
the ease with which they enable textual and multimedia commentary, 
protest, and dissent (SDG 16). Building on the early history of dial- up 
Bulletin Board Systems (BBS) from the late 1980s to late 1990s (Goggin 
and McLelland 2016), the growth of the World Wide Web in the 1990s 
saw the emergence of blogs as a flexible and powerful architecture 
of connection and commentary (Bruns and Jacobs 2006). In many 
countries, blogs enabled writers and activists, audiences and publics 
to engage and connect. Although this first attracted attention in the 
United States, it quickly became influential among social movements 
elsewhere, for example in the Middle East, especially Egypt (el- 
Nawaway and Khamis 2015) and Iran (Sreberny and Khiabany 2010). 
Blogs provide a way for religious, cultural, political, and linguistic com-
munities to connect across territorial boundaries around religion (the 
various Muslim blogospheres:  Russell and Echchaibi 2009), gender 
rights (Guta and Karolak 2015), health issues, and diasporic and sexual 
identities.
But the implications of information and communications technologies 
for achieving social justice and democracy are often ambiguous for sev-
eral reasons. First, patterns of access and use remain very unequal. An 
example from the early 2000s comes from two post- Apartheid South 
African social movements, the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) and 
the Anti- Privatization Forum (APF): although they used websites and 
email to disseminate information, they needed to limit their mobile 
phone use to communications within their organizations. The use more 
recently of smartphones to communicate election messaging does not 
necessarily transform the public sphere overall or citizens’ opportun-
ities within it (Walton and Donner 2009). The use of different media for 
different functions may channel politics and related activity into par-
ticular elite domains (policy discussion by experts, for instance), rather 
than broadly based public spheres in which wider populations can par-
ticipate (Wasserman 2007).
Second, debate continues about the role of social media platforms 
in creating new forms of solidarity and transnational mobiliza-
tion. Facebook has been associated with various social and political 
movements, especially the “Arab Spring” uprisings of 2011, as well as 
the recent “Women’s March” – a worldwide protest held in January 
2017 to protect legislation and policies regarding human rights and 
environmental issues. Meanwhile, Twitter  – relatively simple in its 
design, and without the cross- media integration of Facebook  – has 
nonetheless helped incubate various initiatives based on “hashtag 
publics” (Weller et al. 2013), for example around Iran’s 2009 election 
(Mottahedeh 2015), #BlackLivesMatter in the United States, and the 
#RhodesMustFall protests in South Africa.
At the same time, however, the infrastructure of social media and 
digital platforms remains tightly controlled by their corporate 
owners and managers (Andrejevic 2013), rather than by activists. 
Technological affordances that are key to solidarity – for example the 
hashtag function in Twitter – can be changed overnight by the parent 
corporation without consultation or participation of users. It remains 
very difficult for users or activists to have systematic input into the 
design and governance of commercial social media platforms (Mansell 
2012). Social movements and social justice activists have learned that 
the potential of digital platforms to enhance their communication cap-
abilities goes hand in hand with increased surveillance of their actions 
(Treré 2015). Finally, it is important to remember that the very same 
communication resources that benefit movements for social justice 
and social progress are also benefiting the movements that oppose 
them. We need therefore in reviewing the potential of new media tech-
nologies to acknowledge both affordances and constraints, and how 
they interact in specific contexts.
13.7.3  One Planet, Many Struggles, Many Media
Contemporary protest movements tend to draw on an “enlarged 
media ecology” (Qiu 2008) of old and new media, where traditional 
communication channels are mixed with new digital tools of activism. 
A variety of media ecologies have proved important in the context of 
different struggles for social justice across the world.
The interplay among traditional and digital media reached new heights 
as the Arab uprisings of 2010 and 2011 spawned a vibrant scene of 
dissident media and culture. The rise of political stand- up comedy was 
a hallmark of the uprising: in Bahrain, Syria, and Tunisia digital videos 
bore witness to atrocities, mocked dictators, and showcased a variety of 
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animation, dance, theatre, and song. The media of artists and activists, 
often produced and disseminated under extremely risky conditions, is 
an important form of “creative insurgency” (Kraidy 2016). Meanwhile, 
media- based activism for gender equality and the empowerment of all 
women and girls is also growing worldwide. Through creative media 
strategies, advocacy groups have from the 1990s onwards made 
remarkable progress in the realm of gender equality from universal 
suffrage for women to rights for sexual minorities.
As another example, in the struggle against ISIS, activists have been 
running clandestine festivals of short films, shot on mobile phones, 
thereby defying local political censorship and moral prohibitions. The 
group “Raqqa Is Being Slaughtered Silently” has documented the atro-
cities of daily life under the Islamic State, propagating these on social 
media and connecting with mainstream journalists worldwide.
As these examples also illustrate, care is needed to contextualize the 
role of digital platforms in social movements. Digital technologies and 
social media platforms rarely drive political actions and protest in 
themselves. Social movements’ communication strategies may involve 
not only digital technologies but also a wide range of non- digital 
media. In the 2013– 2016 Gezi Square protests in Turkey, solidarity was 
built through a mix of media that combined photocopied zines and 
street performance with content shared via social media platforms 
(Saybasılı 2014).
A significant new direction in media activism is as a space for political 
agency outside the sectarianism that dominates mainstream media 
and politics in polarized societies. In Lebanon, activists have mobilized 
around issues of environmental justice and the provision of utilities; 
the 2015 “You Stink” Movement, which used digital media to mobilize 
activism about inadequate removal services for municipal waste, was 
a key example of this trend.
Anticorruption campaigning has also harnessed diverse media cap-
abilities. The most dramatic example of using the Internet as an infra-
structure of connection to challenge not just corruption, but state 
and corporate power more generally, is the work of the activist group 
Anonymous with its “denial of service” and other attacks (Coleman 
2014) and the whistleblower platform WikiLeaks (Brevini, Hintz, and 
McCurdy 2013). One of the largest civil society campaigns in recent 
years is the 2011 Indian anticorruption movement triggered by Anna 
Hazare’s hunger strike in New Delhi.
In conclusion, all social justice and social progress initiatives depend 
on complex media ecologies that offer resources while simultaneously 
imposing risks and constraints. Activist individuals and communities, 
not technologies, drive social progress, by meeting the specific commu-
nication and information needs of each social justice context.
13.7.4  Creative Affordances: The Case of Disability 
Movements
An excellent case study of the role that the new affordances of digital 
media technology can play is disability. According to the landmark 
WHO 2011 World Report on Disability, more than 1 billion people 
in the world experience disability (15 percent of the world’s popula-
tion), of whom 110– 190 million experience very significant disabilities 
(SDG 3).
Disability involves a wide range of impairment types from sensory 
disabilities to cognitive disabilities and psychosocial conditions. 
Prevalence of disability is growing due to population ageing and global 
increase in chronic health conditions. Disability is highly correlated 
with disadvantage but not “all people with disabilities are equally 
disadvantaged” (WHO 2011).
A roadmap for putting disability at the heart of the vision for social 
progress was proposed in 2006 by the UN Convention on Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). The CRPD has many provisions, which 
involve communication and technology rights, since media is pivotal 
for achieving human rights in relation to disability. People with disabil-
ities generally experience inferior access to and affordability of media 
infrastructures, technologies, content, and participation, especially in 
the Global South. At the same time, disability becomes a paradigm case 
for rethinking both media and media’s potential contribution to social 
progress. Disability is a key part of wider understandings of cultural 
and media diversity, but is of particular interest because of disability 
struggles’ strong focus on digital technologies and their affordances.
Since the 1970s, the role of media in communicating negative attitudes, 
stereotypes, and myths about disability has been critiqued, commen-
cing with the role of advertising in “charity” discourses of disability 
and a push towards affirmative images of disability. Although still very 
much in the minority, people with disabilities appear as characters of 
TV shows, increasingly reported in news, or, on occasion, as media 
workers, broadcasters, journalists, and celebrities themselves. However 
there remains a hierarchy of what is newsworthy, entertaining, and 
shareable, even in digital platforms. Mainstream media industries gen-
erally lag behind in offering work opportunities to people with dis-
abilities (SDG 8). Disability still occupies a marginal place on media 
professionals’ agendas.
However, in various countries, people with disabilities and their allies 
are using digital platforms in distinctive ways:  for example, US Deaf 
protests in the Gaudallet “Deaf President” campaign; the use of video, 
photography, and social media by Bolivian disability activists in March 
2016 to demand better social support (Goggin 2016); and British dis-
ability movement protests from 2012 against welfare cuts, using blogs, 
Facebook, and Twitter. Through social media, blogs, and websites a 
wide variety of disability publics have emerged. People with disabil-
ities have also developed their own disability media: dedicated blogs 
(Ouch! established by BBC in the UK), disability comedy chatshow 
news genres (The Last Leg, Channel 4 in Britain), disability web- based 
programs (Gimpgirl), and crowd- funding platforms used to fund inves-
tigative journalism or entertainment.
Issues of accessibility to media infrastructures, as well as the poten-
tial affordances of these platforms, are particularly salient for people 
with disabilities, for example, captioning on TV and radio for the 
print handicapped. Despite their long histories, disability media such 
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108399647.006
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Cambridge University Press, on 16 Sep 2019 at 22:52:09, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms.
Media and Communications Chapter 13
13
53
553
as Braille formats and sign language communication are still given 
little recognition in wider society, although there have been concerted 
international efforts on some aspects of digital technology (accessible 
computers and software, web accessibility, mobile phone accessibility, 
“apps” for people with disabilities).
Yet even in areas with the most concentrated effort, such as web 
accessibility, the situation remains inequitable:  most government 
websites across the world have low levels of accessibility compliance, 
despite “digital first” government service, welfare, and e- government 
policies. The implementation of the CRPD requires widespread acces-
sibility, especially across design of digital technologies, but national 
legislatures and media corporations have been slow to act.
The lack of social progress on disability and media is a central issue 
for wider social progress. It constrains the possibilities for social and 
cultural participation of people with disabilities (SPI “Health and 
wellness”). Yet disability has much to teach us about how communica-
tion occurs across the world’s population: communication among, with, 
and by people with disabilities foregrounds issues of voice (Couldry 
2010) and listening (MacNamara 2015): people with disabilities need 
access to public spheres where we can all listen not least governments, 
corporations, civil society, and a wide range of other organizations and 
agents (Goggin 2009). Without that the much- vaunted promises of 
new digital technologies are hollow.
13.8 Summary and Recommendations
This chapter has told two stories. On the one hand, the vast and varied 
media landscape we have depicted offers a complex set of resources 
for daily life and social movements. On the other, this landscape is 
marked by processes of power both old and radically new:  new 
power processes include an emerging logic of data extraction tied to 
an imperative of data stimulation via increased message circulation 
(Sections 13.3 and 13.6). Through this transformation, unfamiliar forms 
of domination and exclusion are emerging, while public discourse 
and practices of government are subject to surprising new pressures. 
The long history of communications, and specifically media technolo-
gies, is now joining up with capitalism‘s development in striking new 
ways. The resulting global information environment requires urgent 
attention, if our understanding of social progress’ dynamics is not to 
be dangerously oversimplified.
Media are an important resource for movements that promote social 
progress, and effective access to media is a necessary component of 
social justice (and a too- little recognized component of social progress 
itself). By “effective access” we mean that all individuals and commu-
nities should be able to use media infrastructures to produce content, 
access information and knowledge, and be active participants in the 
realms of politics, culture, and governance. Three major factors compli-
cate the picture considerably.
First, the distribution of media resources (including traditional media 
and digital platforms) is skewed towards the rich and powerful, 
and away from the majority of the world’s population, especially 
poor, marginalized, and excluded groups. This basic fact is ignored 
by the recurrent “social imaginary” (Taylor 2003) that sees media 
infrastructures as automatically progressive and socially transforma-
tive (for critique, see Herman, Hadlaw, and Swiss 2014; Mansell 
2012; Mosco 2004). Although people rely on media platforms for 
connection and communication, they generally have very little influ-
ence over their design and pricing, or the conditions of access, use, 
or content production and distribution. Second, there is not one 
single space of connection enabled by media, but many such spaces, 
and the relations between them are highly uneven:  questions of 
language and culture, unequal influence over Internet governance, 
software localization and technical design, all make the Internet, in 
particular, a highly uneven playing field for diverse groups, espe-
cially cultural and linguistic minorities. Third, even with access and 
more even distribution of opportunities for effective use, it may not 
be solidarity and dialogue that are facilitated when people come 
together via media (online abuse is also on the rise): the Internet‘s 
capacity, in principle, to enable multiple producers of content is not 
therefore sufficient. A central issue remains: how to design and sus-
tain online spaces that encourage dialogue, free speech, respectful 
cultural exchange, and action for social progress? The governance 
of internet infrastructures is crucial in all of this, but itself highly 
contested and uneven.
In response to these challenges, we recommend that the key measure 
of “social progress” in the global policy community (the SPI) be 
adjusted to recognize effective media access as a new core component 
of social progress:
• While it is important that the SPI under “foundations of well- 
being” includes “access to information and communications” 
(defined in terms of numbers of internet users, mobile phone 
subscriptions, and a Press Freedom Index), this is insufficient: add-
itional measures are needed for the distribution of opportunities 
for effective access and use. Such measures would concern not 
only access to the technological means to receive information 
and content, but also to appropriate pertinent and affordable 
technologies. The design of media infrastructures and digital 
platforms needs to be pertinent to diverse language communi-
ties, individuals with different ability levels, learning styles, and 
financial resources.
• While it is important that the SPI under “Opportunity” includes 
“personal rights” and “tolerance and exclusion,” this is insuf-
ficient:  communication rights must be added to the basket of 
personal rights, taking into account the direct relation between 
lack of participation and diversity in the design and governance 
of media infrastructures and lack of inclusion and tolerance at a 
more general cultural level.
• The right to privacy should also be added, including appropriate 
regulatory frameworks to protect against surveillance and data 
extraction.
• In addition, references to “tolerance” elsewhere in the SPI need 
to be interpreted to include tolerance in the media (that is, the 
absence of hate speech against the LGBTIQ community, women 
and girls, ethnic minorities, etc.)
In addition, we make the following broader recommendations:
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108399647.006
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Cambridge University Press, on 16 Sep 2019 at 22:52:09, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms.
Chapter 13 Media and Communications
13
54 55
554
• Media and communications infrastructures should be regarded 
as a common good, in the same way as other infrastructures 
(roads, railways, etc.). The recent wave of privatization and 
concentration in the media and information industries should 
be reviewed by regulators for its effects on the quality of 
media, its diversity, and its ability to meet people’s needs. The 
encouragement of subsidy and spaces for nonprofit media 
should become an essential component of struggles for social 
progress and social justice. If progress is to be made towards 
these wider goals, major efforts are needed by civil society, 
governments, and international organizations to promote 
and sustain media that exist outside of market forces, and 
to secure noncommercial financial models for their existence 
(e.g. license fees).
• Internet governance should not be in the hands of organizations 
that make decisions, implement policy, and design online 
architectures behind closed doors. Popular participation and 
transparency should be the guiding principles that frame internet 
governance, policy, and regulatory frameworks.
• Equally, processes for the design of digital platforms and other 
means of accessing the Internet should recognize and effectively 
include representation from the full range of human communities.
• Media infrastructures need to work more effectively to facilitate 
the content creation by diverse communities. Access to media 
infrastructures as consumers, receivers, or audiences of content 
and information is not enough; individuals and communities need 
access as content creators; issues of language, affordability, user 
competencies, and technology design are fundamental.
• Core aspects of society such as health care, social services, and 
financial services will be increasingly provided over the Internet 
in the future, access to digital systems needs to be equally 
distributed among populations, and such access should come free 
of commercial tracking and surveillance.
• With increased state and corporate surveillance, censorship, 
and data gathering need to become the focus of extensive civic 
debate and regulatory attention.
• Sound, independent journalism, especially investigative jour-
nalism, is essential to democratic life. Citizens need curated, 
credible, verified, and contextualized information to be able to 
make reasonable decisions in political, cultural, and social arenas. 
Alternative forms of funding investigative journalism therefore 
need to compensate for the threat to the commercial newspaper 
business model.
• Serious attention is needed also on the impact on environmental 
sustainability of the waste generated by today’s communication 
devices and the vast data- processing infrastructure that supports 
their use. This point has not emerged earlier in this chapter, but it 
is an unintended long- term side effect of intensified connection 
through media (Maxwell and Miller 2012).
In all these and many other respects media and communications flows 
and infrastructures are not mere background to social struggles, but 
themselves a site of struggle. We must acknowledge the overall lack 
of progress in media reform over the past 40 years. Since 1980 when 
the NWICO’s MacBride Report was presented by UNESCO, numerous 
initiatives have attempted to reform media infrastructures, including 
the World Summit of the Information Society (WSIS), the Free Press 
movement in the United States, and the net neutrality and free soft-
ware international movements. However, international organizations 
have not generally pursued such concerns. The international 
organizations responsible for proposing media policy (International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU); the Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers (ICANN)) have limited their scope to tech-
nical matters discussed with little input from civil society or social 
movements. A  renewed and more inclusive debate on media reform 
must be launched.
Action plan
1. To add effective media access (as defined above) as a new core 
component of social progress in the SPI, to “ensure afford-
able, reliable, sustainable, and effective access to communi-
cation infrastructure,” while acknowledging the long- term 
environmental waste from IT devices and data processing 
infrastructures.
2. To open a public discussion in which matters of inclusion, afford-
ability, and diversity in media take center stage over markets and 
profit.
3. To position communication rights as central to official definitions 
of Social Progress. Communication rights include the right to be 
a content creator; the right to free expression; the right to know-
ledge and information; and the right to privacy.
4. To pressure international and national regulatory bodies and 
policy makers to design and implement processes for civil society 
participation in internet and media infrastructures’ governance 
and policy. Media infrastructures should be governed by multi- 
stakeholder, transparent, and open bodies.
5. To pressure governments, the private sector, and universities to 
be accountable for designing media platforms that are accessible 
to input from diverse individuals and communities – especially 
marginalized communities such as communities of color, gender 
minorities, LGBTIQ communities, disabled communities, and com-
munities in the Global South.
6. To push for media and internet regulation that protects users 
from state and/ or corporate surveillance and data extraction for 
control or marketing purposes.
7. To promote media and internet regulatory regimes that forbid 
any type of censorship or discrimination based on disability, 
gender, sexual orientation, or political, religious, or ethnic 
affiliations.
8. To promote the notion that “access” also includes opportunities 
for content creation and not the mere technological access to 
platforms for media consumption. Media and information literacy, 
technical competencies, linguistic diversity, and capacity building 
are fundamental elements of access.
9. To re- establish independent, sound journalism as an essential 
element of democracy, and for this purpose to explore alterna-
tive funding models besides the commercial (innovative forms of 
public– private partnership, license fees, etc.).
10. To promote free access to software and free knowledge, as the 
commons of humankind.
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Table 13.1 | Toolkit
Goals/ values Policy makers International 
organizations
Corporate media and 
tech sector
NGOs Citizens
Effective access to 
communication 
infrastructures
Develop regulatory regimes that 
guarantee affordability, cultural 
inclusion, and linguistic 
diversity of media and digital 
platforms
Develop regulation that allocates 
a significant proportion of 
communication resources 
(frequencies, budgets, R&D) to 
citizens’ media initiatives
Develop regulatory systems to 
deal in an environmentally 
friendly way with waste from 
IT products and their use
Promote net neutrality in national 
regulations
Promote the notion that 
“Effective access to 
media infrastructures” 
includes using 
technologies to create 
and disseminate 
content
Monitor media and digital 
content for diversity, 
inclusivity, and access
Sanction corporate media 
and technology 
corporations if they 
fail to comply
Produce tolerant, inclusive, 
and diverse media and 
digital content
Design media and digital 
platforms that can 
be used by citizens 
to produce and 
disseminate their own 
content
Adopt net neutrality
Promote and support 
citizens’ media
Promote media 
production and 
software design 
programs in schools
Promote training 
in media and 
information literacy 
and writing code
Develop and support 
citizens’ media 
(produced by local 
communities for 
local communities)
Develop and support 
school media
Implement citizen- 
run media and 
information literacy 
programs
Demand tolerant, 
inclusive, and 
diverse media and 
digital content 
from the private 
and public media 
sectors
Defend net neutrality
Transparency and 
accountability of 
media and digital 
platforms
Incorporate transparency and 
accountability in international 
and national legislation/ 
regulation on media and the 
Internet
Organize multistakeholder 
international and 
regional forums to 
discuss the future 
of media and digital 
platforms
Help subsidize nonprofit 
media and digital 
platforms
Mobilize civil society to 
participate in global 
and local discussion 
about the future of 
media and digital 
platforms
Demand inclusion and 
voice in global and 
local discussions 
about the future of 
media and digital 
communication
Communication rights:
•  right to be a content 
creator
• right to free expression
•  right to knowledge and 
information
• right to privacy
Include communication rights as 
a fundamental human right in 
national legislations
Develop the necessary 
regulatory frameworks 
for the implementation, 
regulation, and vigilance of 
communication rights
Include communication 
rights in SDGs, 
SPI, and any other 
similar global 
blueprint to assess 
progress, wellbeing, 
and sustainable 
development
Review and adjust 
business models for 
consistency with 
communications rights
Advocate policies, 
regulations, and 
treaties that advance 
communication rights
Produce and disseminate 
content that informs 
audiences about 
communication rights
Raise awareness around 
communication 
rights among social 
justice organizations 
and social 
movements
Demand communication 
rights from national 
governments, the 
private sector 
and international 
organizations
Participatory governance 
of media infrastructures 
and digital platforms
Design media and digital platforms 
regulatory regimes that 
include effective civil society 
participation, and in particular 
participation by representatives 
of indigenous people and 
people with disabilities
Establish a global 
international body 
responsible for 
monitoring and 
assessing access, 
inclusion, diversity, 
and communication 
rights in media 
infrastructures
Promote the notion that 
civil society input 
is essential in the 
governance of media 
and digital platforms
Implement educational 
programs for citizens 
about media and 
internet regulation and 
governance
Include civil society 
participation in all 
aspects of media and 
internet governance 
(e.g. ICANN, WAN- Ifra)
Promote the notion 
that civil society 
participation in 
media and internet 
governance is a right
Implement media and 
internet regulation 
and governance
Demand the opportunity 
to participate in 
media and internet 
governance
Implement citizen- 
run educational 
programs about 
media and internet 
regulation and 
governance
continued on next page ➔
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Goals/ values Policy makers International 
organizations
Corporate media and 
tech sector
NGOs Citizens
Participation of civil society 
in the design of media 
infrastructures and 
digital platforms
Budget public funds for inclusive 
citizen- led research and 
design of digital platforms and 
software, where “inclusive” 
means including, for example, 
women and girls, indigenous 
communities, disabled 
communities, and linguistic 
minorities
Monitor and assess 
the cultural 
appropriateness and 
inclusivity of media, 
digital platforms, and 
software for diverse 
communities
Promote inclusive civil 
society participation 
and input in the 
research and design 
of communication 
technologies
Establish the necessary 
channels to 
incorporate inclusive 
citizen input into 
research and design 
of communication 
technologies, 
especially indigenous 
communities, disabled 
communities, and 
linguistic minorities
Promote research 
and design of 
communication 
technologies in 
schools
Promote design of 
communication 
technologies and 
software driven 
by the needs of 
disadvantaged 
communities 
and specifically 
(a) women and 
girls, (b) indigenous 
peoples, and 
(c) disabled people
Develop and fund 
initiatives for 
sharing knowledge, 
know- how, technical 
expertise, and 
content between 
disadvantaged 
communities
Implement inclusive 
citizen- run, local 
initiatives of 
communication 
technology research 
and design
Demand participation 
in corporate 
and public 
communication 
technology research 
and design
Promote the use 
of open access 
software
Protection from 
surveillance and data 
extraction
Design and implement regulation 
that protects citizens from 
surveillance and data 
extraction by media and 
internet corporations, 
governments, and security 
organizations
Regulate the use of algorithms 
for marketing or surveillance 
purposes
Promote multistakeholder 
regional and 
international forums 
to address surveillance 
and data extraction
Re- position civil society 
organizations as 
key participants 
in regulating the 
consequences of 
surveillance and data 
extraction
Lead a public conversation 
about filtering and 
predictive algorithms
Review and adjust 
business models for 
consistency with rights 
of privacy and data 
protection
Advocate policies, 
regulations, and 
treaties that advance 
rights of privacy and 
data protection
Develop transparent and 
accessible conventions 
for disclosing 
sponsorship, and 
describing the use of 
predictive algorithms
Promote a public 
conversation on 
surveillance and 
data extraction as 
threats to privacy
Expose unlawful 
government 
surveillance 
activities
Support the design and 
distribution of ad 
blockers and tracker 
visualization tools
Demand the right 
to privacy and 
protection against 
data extraction 
by corporate or 
government entities
Demand transparency 
and accountability 
of data collection, 
filtering and the 
use of predictive 
algorithms
Media infrastructures and 
digital platforms free 
from censorship
Develop regulatory regimes that 
demand transparency and 
accountability of content 
filtering mechanisms
Develop legislation that 
protects whistleblowers and 
investigative journalists
Include the social responsibility of 
media and digital platforms as 
a key element of international 
and national media and 
internet legislation
Monitor the transparency 
of content filtering 
mechanisms used 
by corporate and 
government media 
and digital platforms
Promote the need 
for investigative 
journalism as an 
essential component 
of democratic life
Commit to supporting 
independent 
investigative 
journalism as the 
social responsibility 
of media and digital 
platforms
Fund civil society 
initiatives to monitor 
and catalogue 
content removal in 
digital platforms and 
social media
Support independent 
investigative 
journalism initiatives 
(in universities, 
foundations, or 
government- 
sponsored 
organizations)
Demand access to 
knowledge and 
information
Support investigative 
journalism as an 
essential element of 
democratic societies
Table 13.1 | (continued)
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Goals/ values Policy makers International 
organizations
Corporate media and 
tech sector
NGOs Citizens
Media and information 
literacy
Promote the inclusion of media 
and information literacy as a 
core element in educational 
curricula
In collaboration with 
NGOs, civil society, 
and citizens’ media, 
implement media and 
information literacy 
initiatives at the 
local level, especially 
targeting children 
and youth, disabled 
communities, ethnic 
minorities, and other 
vulnerable populations
Develop free and 
accessible media 
and information 
literacy initiatives in 
collaboration with 
NGOs and citizens
Fund/ sponsor media and 
information literacy 
initiatives developed 
by international 
organizations, NGOs, 
civil society, and 
citizens’ media
Promote public 
conversation about 
the improvement 
of media and 
information literacy
Develop local initiatives 
of media and 
information 
literacy – linked 
e.g. to schools, 
universities, 
community 
organizations, and 
local citizens’ media
Linguistic diversity Implement policies that mandate 
subtitles and translation
Design regulatory regimes that 
mandate the production of 
media content and software 
for linguistic minorities and 
disabled communities
Include indigenous people and 
people with disabilities in 
the formulation of media and 
internet regulatory regimes
Coordinate and support 
local initiatives for 
linguistic diversity
Enable global visibility of 
linguistic diversity
Produce content in various 
languages, including 
indigenous languages
Design communication 
technologies and 
software appropriate 
and accessible to 
diverse linguistic 
communities and 
disabled communities
Promote alliances 
and collaboration 
between media 
and digital 
communication 
NGOs and 
indigenous 
NGOs and social 
movements
Mobilize civil society and 
social movements 
to demand linguistic 
plurality in media 
infrastructures
Demand media content 
available in local 
languages
Demand media 
content and 
digital platforms 
tailored to disabled 
communities
Human knowledge as 
commons, instead of 
commodities
Balance intellectual property rights 
with notions of information 
and knowledge as the 
commons of humankind, and 
the value of communication 
and dialogue
Pressure trade agreement 
negotiations to 
balance intellectual 
property protections 
with the rights to 
free knowledge and 
information
Promote free culture and 
free/ libre/ open source 
software
Recognize the limits to 
proprietary claims 
over information, 
expression, and 
innovation
Acknowledge the 
importance for 
social progress of 
the availability of 
nonproprietary 
information, 
expression, and 
innovation
Advocate policies, 
regulations, and 
treaties that advance 
a global knowledge 
commons
Pressure schools to 
embrace free/ 
libre/ open source 
software in the 
classroom
Demand access to 
knowledge and 
information as a 
right, not a privilege
Note: we have allocated the tasks in the toolkit matrix to the actor who should have the main responsibility for each task, however, various tasks should be developed by multistakeholder bodies.
Table 13.1 | (continued)
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